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We propose a security hypothesis that a network is secure, if any deliberate attacks of
a small number of nodes will never generate a global failure of the network, and a ro-
bustness hypothesis that a network is robust, if a small number of random errors will
never generate a global failure of the network. Based on these hypotheses, we propose
a definition of security and a definition of robustness of networks against the cascading
failure models of deliberate attacks and random errors respectively, and investigate
the principles of the security and robustness of networks. We propose a security model
such that networks constructed by the model are provably secure against any attacks
of small sizes under the cascading failure models, and simultaneously follow a power
law, and have the small world property with a navigating algorithm of time complex
O(log n). It is shown that for any network G constructed from the security model,
G satisfies some remarkable topological properties, including: (i) the small community
phenomenon, that is, G is rich in communities of the form X of size poly logarithmic
in log n with conductance bounded by O( 1|X|β ) for some constant β, (ii) small diameter
∗State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P. O. Box 8718, Beijing,
100190, P. R. China. Email: {angsheng, yicheng, zhangw}@ios.ac.cn. Correspondence: {angsheng, yicheng}@ios.ac.cn.
Angsheng Li is partially supported by the Hundred-Talent Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. All authors are
supported by the Grand Project “Network Algorithms and Digital Information” of the Institute of software, Chinese Academy
of Sciences, and NSFC grant No. 61161130530.
1
property, with diameter O(log n) allowing a navigation by a O(log n) time algorithm
to find a path for arbitrarily given two nodes, and (iii) power law distribution, and
satisfies some probabilistic and combinatorial principles, including the degree priority
theorem, and infection-inclusion theorem. These properties allow us to prove that almost
all communities of G are strong, where a community is strong if the seed (or hub) of
the community cannot be infected by the collection of its neighbor communities un-
less some node of the community itself is targeted or has already been infected, and
more importantly that there exists an infection priority tree T of G such that infections
of a strong community must be triggered by an edge in the infection priority tree T ,
and such that the infection priority tree T has height O(log n). By using these prin-
ciples, we show that a network G constructed from the security model is secure for
any attacks of small scales under both the uniform threshold and random threshold
cascading failure models. Our security theorems show that networks constructed from
the security model are provably secure against any attacks of small sizes, for which nat-
ural selections of homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment are the underlying
mechanisms. We also show that networks generated from the preferential attachment
(PA, for short) model satisfy a threshold theorem of robustness of networks with a con-
stant threshold so that the networks constructed from the PA model cannot be even
robust against random errors of small sizes under the uniform threshold cascading
failure model. We design and implement an experiment which shows that overlapping
communities undermine security of networks. Our results here explore that security of
networks can be achieved theoretically by structure of networks, that there is a trade-
off between the role of structure and the role of thresholds in security of networks, and
that neither power law nor small world property is an obstacle of security of networks.
The proofs of our results provide a general framework to analyze security of networks.
2
Network security has been a fundamental issue from the very beginning of network science due to
its great importance to all the applications of networks such as the internet, social science, biological
science, and economics etc. In the last few years, security of networks has become an urgent challenge
in network applications.
Clearly, security depends on attacks of networks. Typical attacks include both physical attack of
removal of nodes or edges and cascading failure models of attacks, similar to that of viruses spreading.
In the case of physical attacks of removal of nodes to destroy the global connectivity of networks, it
was shown (1) that many networks, including the world-wide-web, the internet, social networks, are
extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks of removal of a small fraction of high degree nodes, but at the
same time display a high degree of robustness against random errors.
The second type of attacks is the cascading failure model, see for instance (2), (19), (23), (22). This
model captures the behaviors of spreading of information, of viruses on computer networks, of news
on internet, of ideas on social networks, and of influence in economic networks etc. There are differ-
ent definitions of diffusions in networks in the literature. Here we investigate the threshold cascading
failure model which was formulated in social studies, and used in simulating the epidemic spread in
networks (12). In this model, the members have a binary decision and are influenced by their neigh-
bors in scenarios such as rumor spreading, disease spreading, voting, and advertising etc. This model of
cascading behavior has been studied in physics, sociology, biology, and economics (20), (23), (2), (19).
Blume et al. studied the algorithmic aspect of the threshold cascading failure model on regular
graphs of different patterns, particularly on cliques and trees (4). Kempe et al. considered the influence
maximization problem for the linear threshold model and gave a (1− 1e )-approximation algorithm based
on the sub-modularity of influence functions (13).
In the present paper, we propose a theory of security of complex networks. First of all, we need
to understand what exactly factors of networks determine the security of the networks. We found that
security of a network, G say, depends on the following objects:
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• Strategies of attacks
• Topological structure of the network
• Probabilistic principles
• Combinatorial principles
• The sizes of attacks
• The cost of failures
• Thresholds of vertices, for cascading failure models
A theory is to investigate the mathematical relationships among these objects.
1 Security and Robustness Hypotheses
In this section, we introduce the basic definitions for us to quantitatively analyze the security and robust-
ness of networks.
We define the threshold cascading failure model as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Infection set) Let G = (V,E) be a network. Suppose that for each node v ∈ V , there
is a threshold φ(v) associated with it. For an initial set S ⊂ V , the infection set of S in G is defined
recursively as follows:
(1) Each node x ∈ S is called infected.
(2) A node x ∈ V becomes infected, if it has not been infected yet, and φ(x) fraction of its neighbors
have been infected.
We use infG(S) to denote the infection set of S in G.
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The cascading failure models depend on the choices of thresholds φ(v) for all v. We consider two
natural choices of the thresholds. The first is random threshold cascading, and the second is uniform
threshold cascading.
Definition 1.2 (Random threshold) We say that a cascading failure model is random, if for each node v,
φ(v) is defined randomly and uniformly, that is, φ(v) = r/d, where d is the degree of v in G, and r is
chosen randomly and uniformly from {1, 2, · · · , d}.
Definition 1.3 (Uniform threshold) We say that a cascading failure model is uniform, if for each node v,
φ(v) = φ for some fixed number φ.
To compare the two strategies of physical attacks and cascading failure models of attacks, we intro-
duce the notion of injury set of physical attacks.
Definition 1.4 (Injury set) Let G = (V,E) be a network, and S be a subset of V . The physical attacks
on S is to delete all nodes in S from G. We say that a node v is injured by the physical attacks on S, if v
is not connected to the largest connected component of the graph obtained from G by deleting all nodes
in S.
We use injG(S) to denote the injury set of S in G.
In (16), it was shown that cascading failure models of attacks are better than that of physical attacks,
by simulating the attacks on networks of classical models of networks.
The first model is the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER, for short) model (8), (9). In this model, we construct graph
as follows: Given n nodes 1, 2, · · · , n, and a number p, for any pair i, j of nodes i and j, we create an
edge (i, j) with probability p.
We depict the curves of sizes of the infection set and the injury set of attacks of top degree nodes of
networks of the ER model in Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
5
The second is the PA model (3). In this model, we construct a network by steps as follows: At step
0, choose an initial graph G0. At step t > 0, we create a new node, v say, and create d edges from v
to nodes in Gt−1, chosen with probability proportional to the degrees in Gt−1, where Gt−1 is the graph
constructed at the end of step t− 1, and d is a natural number.
We depict the comparisons of sizes of infection sets and injury sets of attacks of the top degree nodes
of networks generated from the preferential attachment model in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).
Figures 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b) show that for any network, G say, generated from either the ER
model or the PA model, the following properties hold:
1. The infection sets are much larger than the corresponding injury sets.
This means that to build our theory, we only need to consider the attacks of cascading failure
models.
2. The attacks of top degree nodes of size as small as O(log n) may cause a constant fraction of nodes
of the network to be infected under the cascading failure models of attacks.
This means that networks of the ER and PA models are insecure for attacks of sizes as small as
O(log n).
Therefore the main issue of network security is to resist the global cascading failure of networks by
attacks of sizes polynomial in log n.
From Figures 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b), we have that the main issue of network security is to resist
the global failure of networks under cascading failure models, that for both theory and applications,
it suffices to guarantee the security against attacks of sizes polynomial in log n, and that topological
structures of networks are essential to the security of the networks, observed from the comparison of
infection fractions between the ER and the PA models.
According to the experiments in Figures 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b), we propose the following
hypotheses.
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Figure 1: (a), (b) are the curves of fractions of sizes of infection sets and injury sets by attacks of
the top degree nodes of small sizes, i.e., up to 5 log n, for networks of the ER model for n = 10, 000
and for d = 10 and 15 respectively. The sizes of the infection sets are the largest ones among 100
times attacks under random threshold cascading failure model. The infection sets and injury sets
correspond to the blue and red curves respectively.
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Figure 2: (a), (b) are the curves of fractions of sizes of infection sets and injury sets by attacks of
the top degree nodes of small sizes, i.e., up to 5 log n, for networks of the PA model for n = 10, 000
and for d = 10 and 15 respectively. The sizes of the infection sets are the largest ones among 100
times attacks under random threshold cascading failure model. The infection sets and injury sets
correspond to the blue and red curves respectively.
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Security Hypothesis: We say that a network is secure, if any small number of attacks of any strategy
will never cause a global failure of the network.
Robustness Hypothesis: We say that a network is robust, if a small number of random errors of the
network will never cause a global failure of the network.
2 Definitions of security and robustness
As mentioned in Section 1, the main issue is the security for cascading failure models and for attacks of
sizes polynomial in log n.
We propose mathematical definitions for security and robustness of networks based on the security
hypothesis and the robustness hypothesis summarized in Section 1, respectively.
We consider the security of networks with arbitrary sizes. We define the security and robustness of
networks under the threshold cascading failure model as follows:
Let n be the number of nodes of the network. We define
Security With probability 1−o(1), the following event occurs: For any initial set S of size poly(log n),
S will not cause a global cascading failure, that is, the size of the infection set of S in G is o(n).
and
Robustness With probability 1 − o(1), a small number, i.e., poly(log n), of random choices of the
initial set S will not cause a global cascading failure, that is, the size of the infection set of S in G is
o(n).
Let M be a model of networks. We investigate the security of networks constructed from model
M. We define the security of networks for attacks of cascading failure with both random threshold and
uniform threshold respectively. Suppose that G is a network of n nodes, constructed from model M, for
large n.
Definition 2.1 (Random threshold security) For the cascading failure model of random threshold, we
say that G is secure, if almost surely, meaning that with probability 1− o(1), the following holds:
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for any set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, the size of the infection set (or cascading
failure set) of S in G is o(n).
Definition 2.2 (Uniform threshold security) For the cascading failure model of uniform threshold, we
say that G is secure, if almost surely, the following holds: for an arbitrarily small φ, i.e., φ = o(1), for
any set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, S will not cause a global φ-cascading failure, that
is, the size of the infection set of S in G, written by infφG(S), is bounded by o(n).
Definition 2.3 (Security of model M) Let M be a model of networks. We say that model M is secure,
if networks constructed from model M are secure for both random and uniform threshold cascading
failure models of attacks.
Definition 2.4 (Random threshold robustness) For the cascading failure model of random threshold, we
say that G is robust, if almost surely, meaning that with probability 1− o(1), the following holds:
for randomly chosen set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, the size of the infection set of S
in G is o(n).
Definition 2.5 (Uniform threshold robustness) For the cascading failure model of uniform threshold, we
say that G is robust, if almost surely, the following holds: for an arbitrarily small φ, i.e., φ = o(1), for
randomly chosen set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, S will not cause a global φ-cascading
failure, that is, the size of the infection set of S in G, written by infφG(S), is bounded by o(n).
Definition 2.6 (Robustness of modelM) LetM be a model of networks. We say that modelM is robust,
if networks constructed from model M are robust for both random and uniform threshold cascading
failure models of random errors.
In Definitions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5, the sizes of attacks or random errors are polynomial in log n.
This is sufficient for both theory and applications. The reason is that networks constructed from both the
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ER and PA models are insecure, in the sense that attacks of O(log n) top degree nodes may generate a
constant fraction of nodes of the networks to be infected, as shown in Figures 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b).
3 Security model of networks: algorithms and principles
From Figures 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b), we know that nontrivial networks of both the ER model and
the PA model are insecure. This poses fundamental questions such as: Are there networks with power
law and small world property that are secure by Definitions 2.1 and 2.2? What mechanisms guarantee
the security of networks? Is there any algorithm to construct secure networks?
In (15), the authors proposed a security model of networks, and showed by experiments that networks
of the security model are much more secure than that constructed from both the ER and PA models.
Definition 3.1 (Security model) Let d ≥ 4 be a natural number and a be a real number, which is called
homophyly exponent. We construct a network by stages.
1. Let G2 be an initial graph such that each node is associated with a distinct color, and called seed.
2. Let i > 2. Suppose that Gi−1 has been defined. Define pi = (log i)−a.
3. With probability pi, v chooses a new color, c say. In this case, do:
(a) we say that v is the seed node of color c,
(b) (Preferential attachment scheme) add an edge (u, v), such that u is chosen with probability
proportional to the degrees of nodes in Gi−1, and
(c) (Randomness) add d− 1 edges (v, uj), j = 1, 2, . . . , d− 1, where uj’s are chosen randomly
and uniformly among all seed nodes in Gi−1. 1
4. (Homophyly and preferential attachment) Otherwise. Then v chooses an old color, in which case,
then:
1If all the newly created d edges linking from v to nodes in Gi−1 are chosen with probability proportional to their degrees,
then the model is the homophyly model (14).
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(a) let c be a color chosen randomly and uniformly among all colors in Gi−1,
(b) define the color of v to be c , and
(c) add d edges (v, uj), for j = 1, 2, . . . , d, where uj’s are chosen with probability proportional
to the degrees of all the nodes that have the same color as v in Gi−1.
It is clear that Definition 3.1 is a dynamic model of networks for which homophyly, randomness and
preferential attachment are the underlying mechanisms.
As shown in (15), (16), networks constructed from the security model are much more secure than
that of the ER and PA models. To understand the intuition of the security model, we use a figure in (16),
Figure 3 here. It depicts three curves of sizes of infection sets of attacks of top degree nodes of sizes up to
5 · log n under random threshold cascading failure model on networks generated from the security model,
the ER model and the PA model respectively. The curves correspond to the largest infection set among
100 times of attacks over random choices of thresholds of the networks. The figure shows that networks
of the security model are in deed much more secure than that of both the ER and the PA models, even if
we just take the homophyly exponent a > 1 in the security model.
Experiments in (15) showed the following properties:
1. The mechanisms of homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment ensure that networks of
the security model satisfy a number of structural properties such as:
(a) (Small community phenomenon) A network, G say, is rich in quality communities of small
sizes.
In fact, let S be a homochromatic set of G. Then the induced subgraph of S, written by GS ,
is highly connected, and the conductance of S, written by Φ(S), is bounded by a number
reversely proportional to a constant power of the size of the community, i.e., less than or
equal to, O( 1|S|β ), for some constant β, where |S| is the size of S.
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Figure 3: The curves are cascading failures of networks of the ER model, the PA model and the
security model for n = 10, 000, d = 15 and a = 1.5
(b) (Internal centrality) Each community is the induced subgraph of nodes of the same color,
which follows a preferential attachment, and hence has only a few nodes dominating the
internal links of the community.
This shows a remarkable local heterogeneity of the networks.
(c) (External centrality) Each community has a few nodes, including the seed of the community,
which dominate the external links from the community to outside of the community.
2. (Power law) The networks follow a power law.
3. (Small world property) The networks have small diameters.
4. (Global Randomness and uniformity) There is a high degree of randomness and uniformity among
the edges between nodes of different colors.
This shows that the networks have a global homogeneity and a global randomness.
5. A non-seed node, x in a community GX , created at time step t can be infected by a neighbor
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community GY , only if the seed node y0 of GY is created at a time step s > t and an edge (y0, x)
is created by (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
The structural properties in (1) above allow us to develop a methodology of community analysis
of networks. (2) and (3) show that the networks constructed from the security model have the most
important properties of usual networks. (4) and (5) ensure that infections among different communities
are hard. This intuitively explains the reason why networks constructed from the security model show
much better security than that of the classic ER and PA models.
The arguments above imply that the small community phenomenon, local heterogeneity, global ho-
mogeneity and global randomness are essential to the security of networks with power law and small
world property.
In the present paper, we will show that the security model is provably secure by Definition 2.3. The
key idea of the proofs is a merging of some principles of topology, probability and combinatorics.
We use S(n, a, d) to denote the set of random graphs of n nodes constructed by the security model
with homophyly exponent a and average number of edges d 2.
Let G be a network constructed from the security model. We have that each node is assigned a
color. This new dimension of colors allows us to characterize the structures of the networks. In our
security model, every node has its own characteristics from the very beginning of its birth. This feature
is remarkably different from the classic models such as the ER and the PA models. Anyway, the extra
dimension of colors is essential to our understanding of security of networks.
We call a set of nodes of the same color, κ say, a homochromatic set, written by Sκ.
We say that an edge is a local edge if two of its endpoints share the same color, and global edge,
otherwise.
At first, we prove some structural properties of networks of the security model.
2In both Definition of the PA model and the security model in 3.1, we consider d as a constant. Thus in all notations of
O(·), o(·),Ω(·) and ω(·) in the paper, d is always absorbed.
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Theorem 3.1 (Fundamental theorem of the security model) Let a > 1 be the homophyly exponent, and
d ≥ 4 be a natural number. Let G = (V,E) be a network constructed by S(n, a, d).
Then with probability 1− o(1), the following properties hold:
(1) (Basic properties):
(i) (Number of seed nodes is large) The number of seed nodes is bounded in the interval [ n2 loga n , 2nloga n ].
(ii) (Communities whose vertices are interpretable by common features are small) Each ho-
mochromatic set has a size bounded by O(loga+1 n).
(2) For degree distributions, we have:
(i) (Internal centrality) The degrees of the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set follow a
power law.
(ii) The degrees of nodes of a homochromatic set follow a power law.
(iii) (Power law) Degrees of nodes in V follow a power law.
(3) For node-to-node distances, we have:
(i) (Local communication law) The induced subgraph of a homochromatic set has a diameter
bounded by O(log log n).
(ii) (Small world phenomenon) The average node to node distance of G is bounded by O(log n).
(iii) (Local algorithm to find short path between two nodes) There is an algorithm to find a short
path between arbitrarily given two nodes in time O(log n).
(4) (Small community phenomenon) There are 1− o(1) fraction of nodes of G each of which belongs
to a homochromatic set, W say, such that the size of W is bounded by O(loga+1 n), and that the
conductance of W , Φ(W ), is bounded by O
(
1
|W |β
)
for β = a−14(a+1) .
This shows that the network is rich in quality communities of small sizes.
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Theorem 3.1 explores an interesting topology of a network G: (i) G consists of a local structure
and a global structure, (ii) the local structure of G is determined by the small communities which have a
number of local properties, and (iii) the global structure of G follows its own laws. The network is rich in
quality communities of small sizes which compose the interpretable local structures of the network. On
the other hand, there is a global structure of the network which ensures that the whole network is highly
connected, with a power law distribution, and a small diameter property. Communications in G have
two types, the first is the local communications within the small communities of length O(log log n) and
the second is the global ones which make the whole network to be highly connected of length O(log n).
More importantly, there exists a local algorithm running in time O(log n) to navigate in the whole
network. Most of the communications are local ones having length within O(log log n), and the rest of
communications are global ones with length bounded by O(log n). The construction of a network with
explicit marks of local and global structures by Definition 3.1 allows local algorithms of time complex
O(log n) to find useful information in the whole network. This suggests a new algorithmic problem, that
is, to find network algorithms of time complexity polynomial in log n for finding useful information.
Theorem 3.1 ensures that all the communities are small. This guarantees that even if a single node
in a small community infects the whole community, the cascading failure is still a local cost. However
it is not intuitive to understand from Theorem 3.1 the reason why networks of the security model are
secure. In fact, to prove the security theorems, we need to develop some probabilistic and combinatorial
properties of the networks. In (15), the authors analyzed experimentally some of these properties.
Suppose that G = (V,E) is a network constructed from the security model. For a subset X ⊂ V ,
we always use GX to denote the induced subgraph of X in G.
For a set of nodes S, we define C(S) to be the set of colors that appear in S. For a node v, we use
N(v) to denote the set of neighbors of v. Given a node v, we define the length of degrees of v to be the
number of colors associated with the neighbors of v, i.e., |C(N(v))|, written by l(v).
Suppose that N1, N2, · · · , Nl are all the neighbors of v such that nodes in each Ni share the same
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color, and that nodes in different Ni’s have different colors. Let di be the size of Ni, for each i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , l}. Suppose that d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dl(v) (ties break arbitrarily). In this case, we say that
di is the i-th degree of v, and the color of nodes in Ni is the i-th color of neighbors of v, for all i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , l}.
The length of degrees, the i-th degree and the i-th color of neighbors of vertices have some interesting
properties, including the ones validated by experiments in (15): (i) The length of degrees of a vertex is
always bounded by O(log n), (ii) The first degrees d1’s are large, (iii) The second degrees are always as
small as constants, and (iv) For a vertex v, if the length of degrees of v is l(v) > 1, then for any i > 1,
the i-th color of neighbors of v is distributed with a high degree of randomness and uniformity. These
properties are essential to the experimental analysis of security of the networks in (15).
To theoretically prove the results, we define some useful notations.
Definition 3.2 Let G = (V,E) be a network constructed from the security model. Given a node v ∈ V :
1. For every j, we define the j-th degree of v at the end of time step t to be the number of the j-th
largest set of homochromatic neighbors at the end of time step t, written by dj(v)[t].
2. We define the j-th degree of v to be the j-th degree of v at the end of the construction of network
G, written by dj(v).
3. We define the length of degrees of v at the end of time step t to be the number of colors associated
with neighbors of v at the end of time step t, written by l(v)[t].
4. We define the length of degrees of v to be the length of degrees of v at the end of the construction
of G, written by l(v).
In sharp contrast to classic graph theory, for a network constructed from our security model, G say,
and a vertex v of G, v has a priority of degrees. This new feature must be universal in real networks in
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the following sense: A community is an interpretable object in a network such that nodes of the same
community share common features. In this case, a vertex v may have its own community and may link
to some neighbor communities by some priority ordering. In our model, a node v more likes to contact
with nodes sharing the same color (or feature) with it, and has no much preferences in contacting with
nodes in its neighbor communities.
Definition 3.3 (Degree Priority) Let v be a node of G constructed from the security model created at
time step t0, and t ≥ t0.
1. Suppose that N1, N2, · · · , Nl are all the homochromatic neighbors of v at the end of time step t
listed decreasingly by the sizes of the setsNj . For dj = |Nj | for each j, we say that (d1, d2, · · · , dl)
is the degree priority of v at the end of time step t, written by dp(v)[t] = (d1, d2, · · · , dl).
2. We define the degree priority of v in G to be the degree priority of v at the end of the construction
of G, written by dp(v).
The degree priority of nodes in G satisfies some nice probabilistic and combinatorial properties.
Theorem 3.2 (Degree Priority Theorem) Let G be a network constructed from the security model with
d ≥ 2, and a > 1. Then with probability 1−o(1), for a randomly chosen node v, the following properties
hold:
1. The length of degrees of v is bounded by O(log n), which is an upper bound independent of a.
2. The first degree of v is the number of neighbors that share the same color as v.
3. The second degree of v is bounded by O(1), so that for any possible j > 1, the j-th degree of v is
O(1).
4. The first degree of a seed node is lower bounded by Ω(log a+14 n).
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By (2), (3) and (4) of Theorem 3.2, we understand that for a community GX induced by a homochro-
matic set X, the seed node, x0 say, of X has a large first degree and constant second degree, so that it is
unlikely to be infected by a single neighbor community, GY say. Combining with (1), this ensures that
for properly chosen a, the seed node x0 of GX is hard to be infected by the collection of all its neighbor
communities alone. Such a community is regarded as a strong community. Theorem 3.1 ensures that for
properly chosen a, almost all communities are strong, so that each of them is hard to be infected by the
collection of all its neighbor communities alone.
Combining Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 gives us a better understanding for the reasons why net-
works of the security model are secure. However, to prove the security theorems, we have to understand
the cascading behaviors of attacks in the networks.
We define a community of G is the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set. We say that a com-
munity, GX say, is created at time step t if the seed node x0 of X is created at time step t.
To understand the cascading behaviors, we define:
Definition 3.4 Let x and y be two nodes of G. We say that x injures y, if the infection of x contributes
to the probability that y becomes infected. Otherwise, we say that x fails to injure y.
We will show that the infection of a community from a neighbor community satisfies a number of
combinatorial properties.
Theorem 3.3 (Infection-Inclusion Theorem) Suppose that X and Y are two homochromatic sets, and
that GX and GY are two communities. Let x0, and y0 be the seed nodes of X and Y respectively.
Suppose that x0 and y0 are created at time step s and t respectively. Then the injury of GY from
community GX satisfies the following properties:
(1) If s < t, then
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(i) The community GX created at time step s fails to injure any non-seed node in the community
GY created at time step t.
(ii) The injury of the seed node y0 created at time step t from the whole community created at
time step s is bounded by a constant O(1).
(2) If s > t, then
(i) All the non-seed nodes in GX created at time step s fail to injure any node in the community
GY created at time step t.
(ii) The injury of the seed node created at time step t from the community created at time step s
is bounded by 1.
(iii) The injury of a non-seed node in the community created at time step t from the seed node
created at time step s follows the edge created by step (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
(3) The seed node y0 of GY created at time step t can be injured only by:
(i) Communities created at time step < t.
(ii) The seed nodes of communities created at time step > t.
(4) A non-seed node y of GY created at time step t can be injured only by seed nodes created at time
step > t through the edge created by (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
(1), (2) and (3) of Theorem 3.3, together with Theorem 3.2, show furthermore that, a seed node,
v say, of G are strong against infections from the collection of all the communities other than its own
community.
Suppose that X, Y and X are three homochromatic sets created at time steps t1, t2 and t3 respec-
tively. Let x0, y0 and z0 be the seed nodes of X, Y and Z respectively. It is possible that x0 infects a
non-seed node y1 of Y , y1 infects all nodes in Y , including y0, and y0 infects a non-seed node z1 of Z .
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(4) of Theorem 3.3 ensures that t1 > t2 > t3, and that the edges (x0, y1) and (y0, z1) must be created by
(3) (b) of Definition 3.1. The key point is that the edges (x0, y1) and (y0, z1) must be embedded in a tree
of height O(log n) which we will call the infection priority tree (IPT, for short) T of G. The infection
priority tree T of G is essentially a graph constructed by the preferential attachment model with average
number of edges d′ = 1, which almost surely has height O(log n).
Therefore a targeted or infected strong community triggers at most O(log n) many strong commu-
nities to be infected, by Theorem 3.1, each community has size at most O(loga+1 n). For any initial set
of attacks S of size polynomial in log n, suppose that every community which is not strong has already
been infected by attacks on S automatically. Let K be the number of communities that are not strong.
Then there are at most |S| + K strong communities trigger infections in the infection priority tree T .
This shows that there are at most O((|S|+K) · log n) communities in each of which there is at least one
node is infected by attacks on S. In this case, again by Theorem 3.1, even if all the nodes in an infected
community are infected, the total number of infected nodes is a negligible number comparing with the
size of the network. This sketch depends on an estimation of K , the number of communities that are not
strong, which will be given in the full proofs in later sections.
Therefore (1), (2) and (4) of Theorem 3.3 ensure that the infection of a non-seed node, v say, is
always one-way from a seed node created late than v, following an edge in the infection priority tree. By
modulo the injury among the seed nodes, we are able to show that the infections of non-seed nodes can
only proceed in the infection priority tree of height O(log n).
Now we fully understand that the combination of Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 does allow us to prove
some security theorems of the security model. This also explores the following security principle of
networks.
Security Principle:
1. Small community phenomenon (by Theorem 3.1)
21
2. The number of seed nodes or hubs is large (by Theorem 3.1)
3. Almost all seed nodes (or hubs) are strong against infections from the collection of all their neigh-
bor communities alone (by Theorem 3.2)
4. There exists an infection priority tree T of G such that infection of non-seed nodes of a community
from a neighbor community can only be triggered by seed nodes of the neighbor community
through edges in the infection priority tree T of G (by Theorem 3.3)
5. The infection priority tree T of G has height O(log n) (to be proved in Subsection 7.1)
4 Security Theorems
In this section, we state the theorems and discuss the relationships among the theorems.
By applying Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we are able to prove that networks constructed from the
security model are secure against any attacks of small sizes under both uniform and random threshold
cascading failure models.
For the uniform threshold cascading failure model, we have:
Theorem 4.1 (Uniform threshold security theorem) Let G be a graph constructed from S(n, a, d) with
pi = log
−a i for homophyly exponent a > 4 and for d ≥ 4. Let the threshold parameter φ = O
(
1
logb n
)
for b = a2 − 2− ǫ for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0.
Then with probability 1− o(1) (over the construction of G), there is no initial set of poly-logarithmic
size which causes a cascading failure set of non-negligible size. Precisely, we have that for any constant
c > 0,
Pr
G∈RS(n,a,d), G=(V,E)
[
∀S ⊆ V, |S| = ⌈logc n⌉, |infφG(S)| = o(n)
]
= 1− o(1),
where infφG(S) is the infection set of S in G with uniform threshold φ.
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By Theorem 4.1, if a > 4, and d ≥ 4, then for φ = O(1/
√
logb n), networks constructed by the
security model S(n, a, d) are φ-secure. Here φ is arbitrarily close to 0, i.e., φ = o(1). Therefore, by
Definition 2.2, for a > 4, and d ≥ 4, networks in S(n, a, d) are secure under the uniform threshold
cascading failure model of attacks.
For the random threshold cascading failure model, each node v picks randomly, uniformly and inde-
pendently a threshold ρv from 1, 2, . . . , dv. Let infRG(S) be the infection set of attacks on S in G. We
show that graphs generated by S(n, a, d) are secure.
Theorem 4.2 (Random threshold security theorem ) Let a > 6 be the homophyly exponent, and d ≥ 4.
Suppose that G is a graph generated from S(n, a, d).
Then with probability 1− o(1) (over the construction of G), there is no initial set of poly-logarithmic
size which causes a cascading failure set of non-negligible size. Formally, we have that for any constant
c > 0,
Pr
G∈RS(n,a,d), G=(V,E)
[∀S ⊆ V, |S| = ⌈logc n⌉, |infRG(S)| = o(n)] = 1− o(1).
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that for appropriately chosen parameters, networks constructed from
the security model are provably secure for any attacks of small sizes under both uniform and random
threshold cascading failure models. By Definitions 2.2, 2.1, 2.3, and by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the
security model in Definition 3.1 is secure.
The preferential attachment model was proposed to capture real networks. It has become a classic
model of networks. We use P(n, d) to denote the set of random graphs of n nodes constructed from
the PA model with average number of edges d. Numerous experiments have shown that networks of the
preferential attachment model are insecure, see for instance Figure 3. Therefore the best possible result
we could look for would be the robustness results for the PA model. People may take for granted that
networks of the PA model are robust, although there was no definition for robustness in the literature.
Here we have rigorous definition of robustness of a model of networks, given in Definitions 2.5, 2.4, and
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2.6. This poses a fundamental question: Are networks of the PA model really robust?
We show that, for large enough edge parameter d, for uniform threshold cascading failure model, if
the threshold is slightly less than 1/d, then just one randomly picked initial node is sufficient to infect a
significant fraction of the whole network with high probability.
Theorem 4.3 (Global cascading of a single node in PA) For any ε > 0, there exists a positive integer
dε such that for any integer d ≥ dε, if G = (V,E) is constructed from P(n, d), then with probability
1− o(1) (over the construction of G), the following inequality holds:
Pr
v∈RV
[infφG({v}) = V ] ≥
2
3
(
1− 1
(1 + ε)2
)
,
where φ = 1(1+ε)d .
Therefore if log n initial nodes are randomly picked, then the whole graph G will be infected with
probability 1− o(1).
Theorem 4.4 (Global cascading theorem of PA) For any ε > 0, there exists a positive integer dε such
that for any integer d ≥ dε, for threshold parameter φ = 1(1+ε)d ,
Pr
S⊂RV, |S|=logn
[infφG({S}) = V ] = 1− o(1).
Proof 1 By Theorem 4.3.
Consequently, P(n, d) is not φ-robust for all φ ≤ 1(1+ε)d . By Definitions 2.5 and 2.6, and by The-
orem 4.4, the preferential attachment model is not robust. In fact, each of the nontrivial networks con-
structed from the PA model is non-robust. This result shows that if real networks truthfully follow the
PA model, then the networks would be not only insecure, but also unavoidably non-robust. This makes
the situation even worse in practical applications, because, a few or even one random error may cause a
global cascading failure of the whole network.
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On the other hand, we also show that if the threshold is larger than 1/d, then with probability 1−o(1),
o(
√
n) randomly picked initially infected nodes are insufficient to infect even one more node, and the PA
model is robust in this case. In fact, we are able to prove a stronger result that holds for arbitrarily given
simple (or almost simple) graphs 3.
Theorem 4.5 (Robustness theorem of graphs) Given a simple graph G = (V,E) whose nodes have
minimum degree d. Let n = |V | and d be a constant independent of n. Let φ > ld , where l is an integer
from the interval [1, d − 1]. Let S ⊆ V be a randomly picked subset of size k = o(n ll+1 ). Then
Pr
S⊂RV
[infφG(S) = S] = 1− o(1).
By using this, we have:
Theorem 4.6 (Robustness theorem of PA) For any integer d ≥ 2 and φ > 1d , P(n, d) is φ-robust.
Proof 2 Since the number of multi-edges and self-loops in P(n, d) is at most O(log n/n) (with proba-
bility almost 1), the probability that, in randomly picked nλ (λ ≤ 1/2) nodes, there is a node associating
to some multi-edge or self-loop is upper bounded by o(1). It is easily observed that the result is a
straightforward corollary of Theorem 4.5 in the case of l = 1.
Theorem 4.6 implies that for a network constructed from the PA model, if every node has a threshold
≥ φ for some large constant φ, then the network is robust against random errors ( of small sizes).
By Theorems 4.4 and 4.6, the value 1/d is a key threshold for the robustness of the PA model.
The two theorems characterize the robustness of networks of the PA model under uniform threshold
cascading failure model, leaving open for the case of φ = 1/d. This clarifies the experimental results of
robustness of networks of the PA model.
The remaining sections are devoted to proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5. In
section 5, we prove Theorem 3.1. In Section 6, we prove Theorems 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 7, we
3A simple graph is a graph having no multi-edge and self-loop.
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prove Theorems 4.1, and 4.2 by using Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 8, we prove the threshold
theorem of robustness of networks of the PA model, consisting of Theorems 4.3 and 4.5. In Section 9,
we extend the security model to high dimensions so that a node has k colors for k > 1. In this case,
communities in the network are overlapping. We show that overlapping communities undermine security
of networks. In Section 10, we summarize the conclusions and discuss some future directions.
5 The Fundamental Theorem of the Security Model
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1. Before proving the theorem, we state the Chernoff bound below
which will be frequently used in our proofs.
Lemma 5.1 (Chernoff bound, (6)) LetX1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables with Pr[Xi = 1] =
pi and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1 − pi. Denote the sum by X =
∑n
i=1Xi with expectation E(X) =
∑n
i=1 pi.
Then we have
Pr[X ≤ E(X) − λ] ≤ exp
(
− λ
2
2E(X)
)
,
Pr[X ≥ E(X) + λ] ≤ exp
(
− λ
2
2(E(X) + λ/3)
)
.
Let G be a network constructed from the security model. We now prove Theorem 3.1. We will prove
(1), (2), (3) and (4) of Theorem 3.1 in Subsections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
5.1 Basic Properties
In this subsection, we prove (1) of Theorem 3.1. It consists of two results, the first is the estimation of
number of seed nodes, and the second is the upper bound of sizes of the homochromatic sets.
Proof 3 (Proof of (1) of Theorem 3.1) We use G[t] to denote the graph constructed at the end of time
step t of the construction of G. Let T1 = loga+1 n, and Ct be the set of all colors appear in G[t].
For (i). It suffices to show that the size of Ct is bounded as desired. For this, we have:
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Lemma 5.2 With probability 1− o(1), for all t ≥ T1, t2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤ 2tloga t .
Proof 4 The expectation of |Ct| is
E[|Ct|] = 2 +
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
.
By indefinite integral ∫
(
1
loga x
− a
loga+1 x
)dx =
x
loga x
+ C,
we know that if t is large enough, then
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
≤ 1 +
∫ t
2
1
loga x
dx
≤
∫ t
2
6
5
(
1
loga x
− a
loga+1 x
)dx
≤ 4t
3 loga t
,
where 65 and
4
3 are chosen arbitrarily among the numbers larger than 1. Similarly,
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
≥
∫ t
2
1
loga x
dx
≥
∫ t
2
5
6
(
1
loga x
− a
loga+1 x
)dx
≥ 3t
4 loga t
.
By the Chernoff bound and the fact that t ≥ T1 = (log n)a+1, with probability 1−exp(−Ω( tloga t)) =
1− o(n−1), we have t2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤ 2tloga t . By the union bound, such an inequality holds for all t ≥ T1
with probability 1− o(1).
(i) follows from Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2 depends on only the probability pi = 1/(log i)a with which the node created at time step
i chooses a new color. It is a useful fact throughout the proofs, from which we define:
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Definition 5.1 We define E to be the event that |Ct| is bounded in the interval
[
t
2 loga t ,
2t
loga t
]
.
By Lemma 5.2, almost surely, the event E holds for all t ≥ T1.
For (ii). We estimate the size of all the homochromatic sets.
Lemma 5.3 With probability 1− o(1), the following properties hold:
(1) Every community has size bounded by O(loga+1 n), and
(2) For every t ≥ T1, every community at the end of time step t has size bounded by O(loga+1 t).
Proof 5 For (1). It suffices to show that with probability 1 − o(n−1), the homochromatic set of the first
color κ has size O(loga+1 n).
We define an indicator random variable Yt for the event that the vertex created at time t chooses
color κ. We also define {Zt} to be the independent Bernoulli trails such that
Pr[Zt = 1] =
(
1− 1
loga n
)
2 loga t
t
.
Conditioned on the event E , we know that Y :=∑nt=1 Yt is stochastically dominated by Z :=∑nt=1 Zt.
The latter has an expectation
E[Z] ≤
n∑
t=1
2 loga t
t
≤ 2 loga+1 n.
By the Chernoff bound,
Pr[Z > 4 loga+1 n] ≤ n−1.
Therefore, with probability 1− n−1, the size of Sκ is Y ≤ 4 loga+1 n. (1) follows.
For (2). This follows from the proof of (1) above. (2) holds.
Lemma 5.3 follows.
(ii) holds.
This proves (1) of Theorem 3.1.
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5.2 Power Law
In this subsection, we probe (2) of Theorem 3.1, consisting of power law of the induced subgraph of
communities, of the degree distributions of the homochromatic sets, and of the whole network G.
Before proving the results, we first prove both a lower bound and an upper bound for the sizes of
well-evolved communities.
Recall that T1 = loga+1 n. Let T2 = (1− δ1)n, for δ1 = 10loga−1 n . We have:
Lemma 5.4 With probability 1− o(1), both (1) and (2) below hold in G:
(1) For a community created at a time step ≤ T2, it has size at least log n;
(2) For a community created at a time step > T2, it has size at most 30 log n.
Proof 6 For (1). We only need to prove that, on the condition of event E in Definition 5.1, any homochro-
matic set Sκ created before time step T2 + 1 has size at least log n with probability 1− o(n−1).
For every t > T2, let Yt be the indicator random variable that the vertex, v say, created at time step
t chooses old color κ. For t > T2, let {Zt} be the independent Bernoulli trails such that
Pr[Zt = 1] = (1− 1
loga(1− δ1)n)
loga t
2t
. (1)
Conditioned on the event E , we know that Y :=∑nt≥T2+1 Yt stochastically dominates Z :=∑nt≥T1+1 Zt,
which has expectation
E[Z] ≥
n∑
t=T2+1
loga t
2t
≥ δ1
2
loga(1− δ1)n ≥ 4 log n.
By the Chernoff bound,
Pr[Z < log n] ≤ e− 3
2 log n
2×4 = n−
9
8 .
Thus, with probability 1− o(n−1), the size of Sκ is at least log n.
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For (2). The proof is similar to that of (1) above. We only need to prove that, on the condition of event
E , any homochromatic set Sκ created after T2 has size at most 30 log n with probability 1− o(n−1). For
t > T2, we consider the Bernoulli random variables {Zt} defined by
Pr[Zt = 1] = (1− 1
loga n
)
2 loga t
t
. (2)
Note that
E[Z] ≤
n∑
t=T2+1
2 loga t
t
≤ 2δ1
1− δ1 log
a n.
By a similar analysis to that in (1) above, we know that with probability 1 − o(n−1), the size of Sκ is at
most 30 log n.
The proof of Lemma 5.4 depends on both the probability 1 − pi with which the newly created node
chooses an old color, and the randomness and uniformity of the choice of the old color at time step i for
all i’s.
By Lemma 5.4, we know that each of the communities born before time step T2+1 has expected size
ω(1), and that all the communities born at time steps ≤ T2 account for (1−o(1)) of all the communities.
Therefore we prove the power law distribution only for the communities born at time steps ≤ T2.
For both (i) and (ii). Now we turn to prove two results:
(A) For each homochromatic set X, the degrees of nodes in X follow a power law, and
(B) For each homochromatic set X, the induced subgraph GX of X follow a power law.
We prove both (A) and (B) together. We consider only the non-trivial homochromatic sets, i.e., the
well-evolved communities, by ignoring the few most recently created communities.
By (4) of Definition 3.1, each community basically follows the classical preferential attachment
model, we are able to give explicit expressions for the expected numbers of nodes of degree k for all
k, for each of the homochromatic sets and for the induced subgraphs of the homochromatic sets.
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In fact, as we will show below that the contribution to the degrees of a homochromatic set from the
global edges is much more smaller than that from the local edges of the homochromatic set. This is the
key point to our proofs of the power law of almost all the communities.
We use X to denote a homochromatic set of a fixed color, κ say. Let T0 be the time step at which X
is created.
For positive integers s and k, we define As,k to be the number of nodes of degree k in X when |X|
reaches s, Bs,k to be the number of nodes of degree k in the induced subgraph of X when |X| reaches
s, and gs,k to be the number of global edges associated with the nodes in X of degree k in the induced
subgraph of X when |X| reaches s. By definition, we have A1,d = 1 and A1,k = 0 for all k > d, and
B1,k = 0 for all k. We also have As,k = Bs,k + gs,k. Then we establish the recurrence formula for the
expectations of both As,k and Bs,k.
Firstly, we define some notations associated with X and its size |X|:
– we use T (s) (or T , for simplicity) to denote the time step at which the size of X becomes to be s,
– we use s1 to denote the number of global edges connecting to X in the case that |X| = s.
We consider the time interval (T (s−1), T (s)). Then the number of times that a global edge is created
and linked to a node in X of degree k at some time step in the interval (T (s − 1), T (s)) is expected to
be Θ( 1loga T ·
k·As,k
2dT /
loga T
T ) = Θ(
k·As,k
log2a T
). Denote Θ(log2a T ) by s2.
Then for s > 1 and k > d, we have
E(As,k) = As−1,k
(
1− kd
2d(s − 1) + s1 −
k
s2
)
+As−1,k−1 ·
(
(k − 1)d
2d(s − 1) + s1 +
k − 1
s2
)
+O
(
1
s2
)
.
Taking expectations on both sides, we have
E(As,k) = E(As−1,k)
(
1−
(
1
2(s− 1) + s1/d −
1
s2
)
k
)
+E(As−1,k−1)
(
1
2(s − 1) + s1/d +
1
s2
)
(k − 1) +O
(
1
s2
)
. (3)
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If k = d, then
E(As,d) = E(As−1,d)
(
1−
(
1
2(s− 1) + s1/d −
1
s2
)
d
)
+ 1 +O
(
1
s2
)
. (4)
Similarly, for s > 1 and k > d,
E(Bs,k) = Bs−1,k −
d · (kBs−1,k + gs−1,k)
2d(s − 1) + s1 +
d · ((k − 1)Bs−1,k−1 + gs−1,k−1)
2d(s − 1) + t1 +O(
1
s2
).
Taking expectations on both sides, we have
E(Bs,k) = E(Bs−1,k)
(
1− kd
2d(s − 1) + s1
)
+ E(Bs−1,k−1) · (k − 1)d
2d(s − 1) + s1
+
E(gs−1,k−1 − gs−1,k)
2d(s − 1) + s1 +O(
1
s2
). (5)
If k = d, then
E(Bs,d) = Bs−1,d −
d · (dBs−1,d + gs−1,d)
2d(s − 1) + s1 + 1 +O(
1
s2
)
= Bs−1,d
(
1− d
2(s − 1) + s1/d
)
+
(
1− gs−1,d
2d(s − 1) + s1
)
, (6)
and
E(Bs,d) = E(Bs−1,d)
(
1− d
2(s− 1) + s1/d
)
+
(
1− E(gs−1,d)
2d(s− 1) + s1
)
.
To solve the recurrences, we invoke the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 ( (7), Lemma 3.1) Suppose that a sequence {as} satisfies the recurrence relation
as+1 = (1− bs
s+ s1
)as + cs for s ≥ s0,
where the sequences {bs}, {cs} satisfy lims→∞ bs = b > 0 and lims→∞ cs = c respectively. Then the
limitation of ass exists and
lim
s→∞
as
s
=
c
1 + b
.
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For the recurrence of E(As,k), by Lemma 5.4, as n goes to infinity, t = ω(1) also goes to infinity. By
the definition of s2, s2 = Θ(log2a T ) = ω(s).
To deal with s1, we give a upper bound for the expected volume of X at time T , denoted by VT , as
follows.
E(VT ) ≤
T∑
i=2
[(
1− 1
loga i
)
· 2d|Ci| +
1
loga i
· dVi−1
2di
]
≤
T∑
i=2
2d
|Ci| = O
(
T∑
i=2
4d loga i
i
)
= O(loga T ).
So it is easy to observe that s1t = O
(
1
loga T · VT2dT / log
a T
T
)
= O
(
1
loga−1 T
)
goes to zero as s ap-
proaches to infinity.
For the recurrence of E(Bs,k), we show that as s goes to infinity, both E(gs−1,k−1−gs−1,k)2d(s−1)+s1 and
E(gs−1,d)
2d(s−1)+s1 approach to 0. Define gs =
∑
i gs,i to be the total number of global edges associated to
X when |X| reaches s. We only have to show that E(gss )→ 0 as s→∞.
Suppose that the seed node of X is created at time T0.
E(gs) = O

T (s)∑
i=T0
1
loga i
· Vi
2di

 = O

T (s)∑
i=T0
log i
2di

 = O(log2 T (s)− log2 T0).
Note that when we consider the size of X at sometime t > T0, we have
E(|X|) =
t∑
i=T0
(
1− 1
loga i
· 1|Ci|
)
= Ω

 t∑
i=T0
loga i
2i


= Ω
(∫ t
T0
loga x
2x
dx
)
= Ω(loga+1 t− loga+1 T0).
Thus at time T (s), by the Chernoff bound, with probability 1− o(1), s = Ω(loga+1 T (s)− loga+1 T0).
Therefore, E(gs) = o(s), that is, E(gss )→ 0 as s→∞.
Then we turn to consider the recurrences of E(As,k) and E(Bs,k). The terms s1/d and 1s2 in equal-
ities (3) and (4) are comparatively negligible. The terms E(gs−1,k−1−gs−1,k)2d(s−1)+s1 and
E(gs−1,d)
2d(s−1)+s1 in equalities
(5) and (6), respectively, are also comparatively negligible. By Lemma 5.5, E(As,k)s and
E(Bs,k)
s must
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have the same limit as t goes to infinity. Next, we will only give the proof of the power law distribution
for E(As,k), which also holds for E(Bs,k).
Denote by Sk = limt→∞
E(As,k)
s for k ≥ d. In the case of k = d, we apply Lemma 5.5 with bs = d2 ,
cs = 1 +O(
1
s2
), s1 = −1, and get
Sd = lim
s→∞
E(As,d)
t
=
1
1 + d2
=
2
2 + d
.
For k > d, assume that we already have Sk−1 = limt→∞
E(As,k−1)
t . Applying Lemma 5.5 again with
bs =
k
2 , cs =
E(As−1,k−1)
s−1 · k−12 , s1 = −1, we get
Sk = lim
t→∞
E(As,k)
s
=
Sk−1 · k−12
1 + k2
= Sk−1 · k − 1
k + 2
.
Thus recurrently, we have
Sk = Sd · (d+ 2)!(k − 1)!
(d− 1)!(k + 2)! =
2d(d + 1)
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
. (7)
This implies
|E(As,k)− Sk · s| = o(s),
and thus
E(As,k) = (1 + o(1))k
−3s.
Since s = ω(1) goes to infinity as n→∞, E(As,k) ∝ k−3. For the same reason, E(Bs,k) ∝ k−3. This
proves (A) and (B), and also completes the proof of both (i) and (ii).
For (iii). For the whole network, a key observation is that the union of several power law distributions
is also a power law distribution if the powers are equal. We will give the same explicit expression of the
expectation of the number of degree k nodes by combining those for the homochromatic sets, leading to
a similar power law distribution.
To prove the power law degree distribution of the whole graph, we take the union of distributions of
all homochromatic sets. We will show that with overwhelming probability, almost all nodes belong to
some large homochromatic sets so that the role of small homochromatic sets is negligible.
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Suppose that G has m homochromatic sets of size at least log n. For i = 1, . . . ,m, let Mi be the size
of the i-th homochromatic set and N (i)s,k denote the number of nodes of degree k when the i-th set has size
s. For each i, we have
lim
n→∞
E(N
(i)
Mi,k
)
Mi
= Sk.
Hence,
lim
n→∞
E(
∑m
i=1N
(i)
Mi,k
)∑m
i=1Mi
= Sk.
Let M0 denote the size of the union of all other homochromatic sets of size less than log n, and N (0)s,k
denote the number of nodes of degree k in this union when it has size s. By Lemma 5.4, with probability
1− o(1), all these sets are created after time T2, and thus M0 ≤ n− T2 = 10nloga−1 n = o(n).
Define Nt,k to be the number of nodes of degree k in Gt, that is, the graph obtained after time step t.
Then we have
lim
n→∞
E(Nn,k)
n
= lim
n→∞
E(
∑m
i=0N
(i)
Mi,k
)∑m
i=0Mi
.
For M0, we have that
lim
n→∞
M0∑m
i=1Mi
= lim
n→∞
M0
n−M0 = 0
and
lim
n→∞
E(N
(0)
M0,k
)
n
≤ lim
n→∞
M0
n
= 0
hold with probability 1− o(1). So
lim
n→∞
E(Nn,k)
n
= lim
n→∞
E(
∑m
i=1N
(i)
Mi,k
)∑m
i=1Mi
= Sk.
This implies
|E(Nn,k)− Sk · n| = o(n),
and thus,
E(Nn,k) = (1 + o(1))k
−3n,
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and E(Nn,k) ∝ k−3. (iii) follows.
This completes the proof Theorem 3.1 (2).
5.3 Small World Property
For Theorem 3.1 (3). Now we turn to prove the properties of small diameters of each homochromatic
set and small world phenomenon of networks of the security model.
For (i). The diameter of the standard PA model is well-known (5), where it has been shown that a ran-
domly constructed graph from the PA model, written G(n, d), has a diameter O(log n) with probability
1−O( 1
log2 n
).
(i) follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 (1) (ii).
For (ii). Now we prove the small world phenomenon. We adjust the parameters in the proof of the
PA model in (5) to get a weaker bound on diameters, but a tighter probability. In so doing, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.6 For any constant a′ > 2, there is a constant K such that with probability 1 − 1
na′+1
, a
randomly constructed graph G from the PA model P(n, d) has a diameter Kn1/(a′+1).
Proof 7 By a standard argument as that in the proof of the small diameter property of networks of the
preferential attachment.
Moreover, to estimate the distances among seed nodes, we recall a known conclusion on random
recursive trees. A random recursive tree is constructed by stages, at each stage, one new vertex is created.
A newly created node must be linked to an earlier node chosen according to a uniform choice. In this
case, we call it a uniform recursive tree (17). We use a result of Pittel in (21), saying that the height of a
uniform recursive tree of size n is O(log n) with high probability.
Lemma 5.7 ( (21)) With probability 1−o(1), the height of a uniform recursive tree of size n is asymptotic
to e log n, where e is the natural logarithm.
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To estimate the average node-to-node distance of G, we assume that there are m homochromatic sets
of size at most log n. Choose a′ in Lemma 5.6 to be the homophyly exponent a, and then we have a
corresponding K .
Given a homochromatic set S, we say that S is bad, if the diameter of S is larger than K|S|1/(a+1).
We define an indicator XS of the event that S is bad. Since log n ≤ |S| = O(loga+1 n), by Lemma
5.6, we have
Pr[XS = 1] ≤ 1
loga+1 n
.
By Lemma 5.2, the expected number of bad sets is at most 2nloga n · 1loga+1 n = 2nlog2a+1 n . By the
Chernoff bound, with probability 1−O(n−2), the number of bad sets is at most 3n
log2a+1 n
. Thus the total
number of nodes belonging to some bad set is at most 3nloga n . On the other hand, for any large set S that
is not bad, its diameter is at most K|S|1/(a+1) = O(log n).
Given two nodes u and v with distinct colors. Suppose that c0 nd c1 are the colors of u and v
respectively, that X and Y are the sets of nodes of colors c0 and c1 respectively, and that u0 and v0 are
the seed nodes in X and Y respectively. We consider a path from u to v as follows: (a) the first part
is a path from u to u0 within the induced subgraph of X, (b) the second part is a path from u0 to v0
consisting of only global edges, and (c) the third part is a path from u0 to u, consisting of edges in the
induced subgraph of Y . By the argument above, the number of the union of all bad homochromatic sets
is bounded by O( nloga n). By Definition 3.1, the giant connected component of all the seed nodes can be
interpreted as a union of d uniform recursive trees. By lemma 5.7, with probability 1 − o(1), there is a
path from u0 to v0 in the induced subgraph of all seed nodes with length at most O(log n). Combining
the three paths in (a), (b) and (c) above, we know that the average node to node distance in G is at most
O(
2n2
loga n
·loga+1 n+n2·logn
n2
) = O(log n). (ii) follows.
For (iii). Suppose that G is a network constructed from the security model. We interpret G as a
directed graph as follows: For an edge (u, v) in G, if u and v are created at time steps i, j respectively,
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then for i > j, we identify the edge (u, v) as a directed edge (i, j).
We give an algorithm as follows: For any two nodes u, v in G,
1. Following the direction of time order in G (that is, an edge (x, y) means that y is created earlier
than x) to find the seed nodes of the homochromatic sets of u and v, u0 and v0 say, respectively.
2. Take random walks from u0 and v0 in a directed uniform recursive tree of all the seed nodes created
in (3) (c) of Definition 3.1, until the two random walks cross.
By (i), step (1) runs in time O(log log n), by Lemma 5.7, step (2) runs in time O(log n). (iii) follows.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1 (3).
5.4 Small Community Phenomenon
Before proving (4) of Theorem 3.1, we introduce some notations.
Let X be a homochromatic set, and x0 be the seed node of X. We say that X is created at time step
t, if the seed node x0 of X is created at time step t.
Suppose that X is a homochromatic set. Recall that X is created at time t0, if the seed of X is created
at time step t0. For t ≥ t0, we use X[t] to denoted the set of all nodes sharing the same color as that
created at time step t0 at the end of time step t. That is, we use X[t] to denote a homochromatic set at
the end of time step t.
For Theorem 3.1 (4). Next, we prove the small community phenomenon stated in Theorem 3.1 (4).
Intuitively speaking, we will show that the homochromatic sets created not too early or too late 4 are
good communities with high probability. Then the conclusion follows from the fact that the number of
nodes in the remaining homochromatic sets only takes up a o(1) fraction.
We focus on the homochromatic sets created in time interval [T3, T4], where T3 = nloga+2 n , T4 =(
1− 1
log(a−1)/2 n
)
n.
4From now on, whenever we say that a homochromatic set appears at sometime, we mean that its seed node appears at that
time.
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Given a homochromatic set S, we use tS to denote the time at which S is created.
Let S be a homochromatic set with tS ∈ [T3, T4], and let s be the seed node of S. For any t ≥ tS ,
we use ∂(S)[t] to denote the set of edges from S[t] to S[t], the complement of S[t]. By Definition 3.1,
∂(S)[t] consists of two types of edges:
(1) The edges from the seed node of S[t] to earlier nodes, i.e., the edges of the form (tS , j) for some
j, and
(2) The edges from the seed nodes created after time tS to nodes in S[t]
By Definition 3.1, the number of edges of type (1) above is at most d.
We only need to bound the number of the second type of edges. We first make an estimation on the
total degrees of nodes in S[t] at any given time t > tS .
For each t ≥ tS , we use D(S)[t] to denote the total degree of nodes in S[t] at the end of time step t
of Definition 3.1. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8 For any homochromatic set S created at time tS ≥ T3, D(S)[n] = O(loga+1 n) holds with
probability 1− o(1).
Proof 8 We only need to show that for any t ≥ T3, if S is a homochromatic set created at time step t,
then Dn(S)[n] = O(loga+1 n) holds with probability 1 − o(n−1). Without loss of generality, assume
that S is created at time step tS = T3. The recurrence on D(S)[t] can be written as
E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1]] = D(S)[t− 1] + 1
loga t
[
D(S)[t− 1]
2d(t− 1) + (d− 1) ·
1
|Ct−1|
]
+
(
1− 1
loga t
)
· 2d|Ct−1| .
We suppose again the event E that for all t ≥ T1 = loga+1 n, t2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤ 2tloga t , which almost
surely happens by Lemma 5.2. It holds also for t ≥ T3. On this condition,
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E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1], E ] ≤ D(S)[t− 1]
[
1 +
1
loga t
1
2d(t − 1)
]
+
2d
|Ct−1|
≤ D(S)[t− 1]
[
1 +
1
loga t
1
2d(t − 1)
]
+
4d loga t
t
. (8)
Then we use the submartingale concentration inequality (see (7), Chapter 2, for information on martin-
gales) to show that D(S)[t] is small with high probability.
Since
8d loga+1(t+ 1)− 8d
(
1 +
1
log t
1
2d(t− 1)
)
· loga+1 t
≥ 8d loga t
(
log
t+ 1
t
)
− 8d log
a t
2d(t − 1)
≥ 8d log
a t
t+ 1
− 8d log
a t
2d(t − 1)
≥ 4d log
a t
t
,
applying it to Inequality (8), we have
E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1], E ]− 8d loga+1(t+ 1)
≤ (1 + 1
log t
1
2d(t− 1))(D(S)[t− 1]− 8d log
a+1 t).
For t ≥ T3, define θt = Πti=T3+1(1 + 1log i 12d(i−1) ) and X[t] =
D(S)[t]−8d loga+1(t+1)
θt
. Then
E[X[t] | X[t− 1], E ] ≤ X[t− 1].
Note that
X[t]− E[X[t] | X[t− 1], E ] = D(S)[t]− E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1], E]
θt
≤ 2d,
Since
D(S)[t]−D(S)[t− 1] ≤ 2d,
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we have
Var[X[t] | X[t− 1], E ] = E[(X[t] − E(X[t]|X[t − 1], E))2]
=
1
θ2t
E[(D(S)[t] − E(D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1], E))2]
≤ 1
θ2t
E[(D(S)[t] −D(S)[t− 1])2|D(S)[t− 1], E ]
≤ 2d
θ2t
E[D(S)[t] −D(S)[t− 1] | D(S)[t− 1], E ]
≤ 2d
θ2t
[
4d loga t
t
+
1
loga t
· D(S)[t− 1]
2d(t− 1)
]
=
8d2 loga t
tθ2t
+
1
(t− 1)θt loga t ·
D(S)[t− 1]
θt
≤ 8d
2 loga t
tθ2t
+
8d loga+1 t
(t− 1)θ2t loga t
+
X[t− 1]
(t− 1)θt loga t
≤ 9d
2 loga t
tθ2t
+
X[t− 1]
2d(t− 1)θt loga t .
Note that θt can be bounded as
θt ∼ e
∑t
i=T3+1
1
2d(i−1) log i ∈ [( t
T3
)
1
2d log n , (
t
T3
)
1
2d log T3 ].
Then
t∑
i=T3+1
9d2 loga i
iθ2i
≤ 9d2 loga n
∫ t
T3
1
i
·
(
T3
i
) 1
d log n
di ≤ 9d2 loga n · log n = 9d2 loga+1 n,
and
t∑
i=T3+1
1
2d(i − 1)θi loga i ≤
1
d loga T3
∫ t
T3
T
1
2d log n
3
i · i 12d log n
di ≤ log n
d loga T3
.
Here we can safely assume that X[t] is non-negative, which means that D(S)[t] ≥ 8 loga+1(t + 1),
because otherwise, the conclusion follows immediately. Let λ = 10 loga+1 n. By the submartingale
inequality ( (7), Theorem 2.40),
Pr[X[t] = ω(loga+1 n)] ≤ Pr[X[t] ≥ X[T3] + λ]
≤ exp(− λ
2
2(9d3 loga+1 n+ 10 loga+1 n+ dλ/3)
) +O(n−2) = O(n−2).
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This implies that D(S)[n] = O(loga+1 n) holds with probability 1−O(n−2).
Let S be a homochromatic set created at some time tS < T4. Let s be the seed node of S. We
consider the edges from seed nodes created after time step tS to nodes in S. For t > tS , if a seed node,
v say, is created at time step t, then there are two types of edges from v to nodes in S[t− 1], they are:
(1) (First type edges) An edge (v, u) for some u ∈ S[t− 1] created in step (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
We call the edges created in (1) are the first type edges.
(2) (Second type edges) Some edges (v, s) for the seed node s ∈ S[t − 1] created by step (3) (c) of
Definition 3.1.
We call the edges created in (2) above the second type edges.
We will bound the numbers of these two types of edges, respectively.
By a similar proof to that in Lemma 5.4 (1), we are able to show that, with probability 1 − o(1),
S = S[n] has a size Ω(log
a+1
2 n), and so a volume Ω(log
a+1
2 n). We suppose the event, denoted by F ,
that for any t ≥ TS , D(S)[t] = O(loga+1 n), which holds with probability 1− o(1) by Lemma 5.8. For
each t ≥ TS , we define a 0, 1 random indicator variable Xt which indicates the event that the first type
edge connects to S at time t and satisfies
Pr[Xt = 1|F ] = 1
loga t
D(S)[t− 1]
2d(t− 1) ≤
log1+ǫ n
2d(t− 1) ,
for arbitrarily small positive ǫ, i.e., 0 < ǫ < a−14 . Then
E[
n∑
t=tS
Xt] ≤ log1+ǫ n
n∑
t=tS
1
2d(t − 1) ≤ (log
1+ǫ n)(log log n).
By the Chernoff bound,
Pr[
n∑
t=tS
Xt ≥ 2(log1+ǫ n)(log log n)] ≤ n−2.
That is, with probability at least 1 − n−2, the total number of first type edges is upper bounded by
2(log1+ǫ n)(log log n).
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For the second type of edges, conditioned on the event E , this number is expected to be at most
n∑
t=T3
1
loga t
· 1|Ct| · (d− 1) ≤ O(
n∑
t=T3
1
loga t
· 2 log
a t
t
) = O(log log n).
So by the Chernoff bound, with probability 1 − o(1), the number of second type of edges is upper
bounded by O(log n).
Hence, with probability 1− o(1), the conductance of S is
Φ(S) = O
(
2(log1+ǫ n)(log log n) + log n
log(a+1)/2 n
)
≤ O
(
log−
a−1
4 n
)
≤ O
(
|S|− a−14(a+1)
)
.
The total number of nodes belonging to the homochromatic sets which appear before time T3 or after
time T4 is at most loga+1 n · nloga+2 n + nlog(a−1)/2 n = o(n) for any constant a > 1. Therefore, 1 − o(1)
fraction of nodes of G belongs to a subset W of nodes, which has a size bounded by O(loga+1 n) and a
conductance bounded by O
(
|W |− a−14(a+1)
)
. This proves Theorem 3.1 (4).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
6 Probabilistic and Combinatorial Principle
Theorem 3.1 provides the necessary structural properties for proving Theorems 4.1, and 4.2. In this
section, we prove the necessary probabilistic and combinatorial principles for the proofs of the security
theorems, that is, Theorem 3.2, and Theorem 3.3.
6.1 Degree Priority Theorem
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof 9 (Proof of Theorem 3.2) For (1). To bound the expected length of degrees for all nodes, it suffices
to bound the length of degrees of seed nodes. Let v be a seed node created at time t0.
By Lemma 5.2, for each t, |Ct| is expected to be Θ( tloga t). Thus the expected number of seed nodes
created after time t0 and linked to v is at most d · 1loga t · 1|Ct| = O(1t ). This shows that
E[l(v)] = O(
n∑
t=1
1
t
) = O(log n).
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(1) follows.
For (2), (3) and (4). We prove (2) - (4) together by considering two cases:
Case 1. v is a non-seed node.
Suppose that v is created at time step t0. We use D(v) to denote the degree of v contributed by nodes
of the same color as v, and F (v) to denote the maximal degree of v contributed by nodes that share the
same color other than the color of v. By (4) of Definition 3.1, D(v)[t0] = d, and F (v)[t0] = 0.
For t + 1 > t0, let u be the node created at time step t + 1. If u is a seed node, then by (3) of
Definition 3.1, we have that D(v)[t + 1] = D(v)[t] and F (v)[t + 1] ≤ max{F (v)[t], 1}. If u is a
non-seed node, then either u has the same color as that of v, or u chooses an old color different from
that of v, in either case, we have that D(v)[t+ 1] ≥ D(v)[t] and F (v)[t + 1] = F (v)[t].
Therefore, we have that the first degree of v, d1(v) is always contributed by the neighbors of v that
share the same color as v, that is, D(v), and that the second degree d2(v) ≤ 1.
Case 2. v is a seed node.
Let v be a node created at time step t0. We use F (v)[t] to denote the largest number of homochromatic
neighbors having different color from v at the end of time step t.
By step (3) of Definition 3.1, F (v)[t0] ≤ d. For every t ≥ t0, We consider time step t + 1. Let u
be the node created at time step t + 1. If u is a seed node, then by (3) of Definition 3.1, we have that
F (v)[t + 1] ≤ max{F (v)[t], d}. If u is a non-seed node, then by (4) of Definition 3.1, F (v)[t + 1] =
F (v)[t].
Therefore, we have that F (v)[n] ≤ d = O(1).
Next we consider the degree of v contributed by the neighbors of the same color as v. Note that a
seed node has a degree at least d contributed by local edges, unless the homochromatic set of the seed
node is too small. This kind of seed nodes is likely to be created too late. We choose an appreciate time
stamp T and show that there are only a negligible number of seed nodes born after T and all the seed
nodes born before T + 1 are contained in homochromatic sets of non-negligible size and thus have a
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large degree contributed by local edges.
Here we choose the time step T = T4, defined in Subsection 5.4.
By the proof of Lemma 5.4, the homochromatic sets created at time step ≤ T4 has size at least
Ω(log
a+1
2 n) with probability 1− o(1). The next lemma guarantees that a seed node of a homochromatic
set of size Ω(log a+12 n) has degree Ω(log a+14 n) contributed by local edges.
By Definition 3.1 (4), the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set basically follows the PA scheme,
so it suffices to prove a result for networks of the PA model.
Lemma 6.1 Suppose that G is a network generated from the preferential attachment model. Let vi be
the i-the vertex in G. Then we have that the degree of vi is expected to be
√
n
i · d.
Proof 10 Let si be the expected degree of vi. Fix i, and for j ≥ i, let ai(j) be the expected degree
contributed by vj to vi and Ti(j) be the expected degree of vi at the end of step j. So for each i,
ai(i) = Ti(i) = d, Ti(n) = si and Ti(j) =
∑j
k=i ai(k). Note that the volume of the whole graph at
step j is 2dj. For j ≥ i, ai(j + 1) = Ti(j)2dj · d = Ti(j)2j , and hence Ti(j + 1) = Ti(j) + Ti(j)2j . By this
recurrence equation, we have
Ti(n) =
n−1∏
j=i
(1 +
1
2j
) · Ti(i).
Define a function f(m) =
m−1∏
j=1
(1 + 12j ). So Ti(n) =
f(n)
f(i) · d. Since f(n) = (2n−1)!22(n−1) [(n−1)!]2 , by the
Stirling formula, when n is large enough, f(n) = 2√
π
· √n. Thus, si = Ti(n) =
√
n
i · d.
So by step (3) of Definition 3.1, with probability 1 − o(1), a homochromatic set of size at least
Ω(log
a+1
2 n) has a seed node of degree at least Ω(log a+14 n) contributed by local edges. So the seed
nodes created at time step ≤ T4 have their first degrees contributed by local edges with probability
1− o(1).
By the proof in Sunsection 5.4, the number of seed nodes created after time step T4 is negligible.
Therefore with probability 1− o(1), a randomly picked seed node has its first degree contributed by
its neighbors sharing the same color as the seed node.
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All (2), (3) and (4) follow from Cases 1 and 2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
6.2 Infection-Inclusion Theorem
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 3.3. At first, we give a basic definition of communities, targeted
communities, and infected communities.
Definition 6.1 Let G be a network constructed from the security model.
(1) A community of G is the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set of G.
(2) We say that a community, GX say, is created at time step t, if the seed node of GX is created at
time step t.
(3) We say that a community, GX say, is targeted, if there is a node in X which is targeted by an
attack, and non-targeted, otherwise.
(4) We say that a community GX is infected, if there is a node in X which has been either targeted or
infected, and non-infected, otherwise.
Proof 11 (Proof of Theorem 3.3) For (1). We consider two cases:
For (i). The infection of GY from a non-seed node x1 in GX .
By Definition 3.1, there is no edges between non-seed nodes in GX and non-seed nodes in GY , and
there is no edge between the seed node of GX and non-seed nodes in GY .
Therefore, there is no injury from GX to any non-seed node in GY . Hence the only possible node in
GY which may be injured by GX is the seed node y0 of GY . (i) follows.
For (ii). The injury of the seed node in GY from GX .
By Theorem 3.2, the number of neighbors of the seed node y0 (of GY ) in GX is less than or equal to
the second degree of y0, which is at most a constant.
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For (2). Suppose that x1 and y1 are non-seed nodes in X and Y respectively.
For (i). The injury of GY from the non-seed node x1.
This fails to occur since at the stage at which x1 is created, it links to nodes only in GX .
For (ii). The injury of the seed node y0 of GY from the whole community GX .
In this subcase, the possible neighbors of y0 in GX is only the seed x0 of GX , and y0 is a seed node
of GY . Therefore the injury of y0 from GX is bounded by 1.
For (iii). The injury of a non-seed node y1 from GX .
The same as that in (i) and (ii) above, the only possible neighbors of y1 in GX is the seed node x0 of
GX . In this case, by Definition 3.1, the only possibility that there is a link between x0 and and a non-seed
node y of GY is that y is the unique node chosen by the preferential attachment scheme in step (3) (b) of
Definition 3.1 at the time step at which x0 is created.
(3) and (4) follow from (1) and (2).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
7 Security Theorems of the Security Model
In this section, we will prove the security theorems of the security model, i.e., Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, by
applying the fundamental theorem, i.e., Theorem 3.1, and the probabilistic and combinatorial principles
in Theorems 3.2, and 3.3.
7.1 Infection Priority Tree
In this subsection, we propose the notion of infection priority tree of a network and develop the key
lemmas to the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, by using Theorems 3.2, and 3.3.
At first, we have that
Lemma 7.1 (Infection Lemma) For any communities GX and GY , the injury of GY from the whole
community GX satisfies:
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1. For the seed node y0 of GY , the injury of y0 from GX is bounded by O(1).
2. For a non-seed node y ∈ Y , GX injures y, only if the following occurs:
• y is injured only by the seed node x0 of GX ,
• y is created before the creation of the seed x0 of GX , and
• At the time step at which x0 is created, (3) (b) of Definition 3.1 occurs, which creates an edge
(x0, y).
Proof 12 By Theorem 3.3.
By Theorem 3.1 (2) (i), every community has size bounded by O(loga+1 n), we can safely assume
the following:
Definition 7.1 (Convention) For any community GX , if there is a node x ∈ X is either targeted or
infected, then all the nodes in X have been infected.
By Definition 7.1, we consider only the infections among different communities. By Lemma 7.1, we
only consider two types of injuries among two communities.
Definition 7.2 (Injury Type) We define:
1. (First type) The first type of injury is the injury of a seed node.
2. (Second type) The second type is an injury following an edge created by (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
To deal with the first type injury, we introduce the notion of strong communities.
Definition 7.3 Given a homochromatic set X, suppose that x0 is the seed node of X, and that GX is the
community induced by X.
We say that GX is a strong community, if the seed node x0 ∈ X will never be infected, unless there is
a node x ∈ X which has already been infected. Otherwise, we say that GX is a vulnerable community.
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By Theorem 3.2, for every seed node x of a community GX , the length of degrees of v is bounded by
O(log n), and the second degree of v is bounded by O(1), therefore the injury of the seed node x from
the collection of all communities other than GX itself can be bounded by O(log n). This allows us to
show that for any set of attacks of poly logarithmic sizes, almost surely, there is a huge number of strong
communities.
By Lemma 7.1, the injury among strong communities is the second type. To analyze the infections
among the strong communities, we define the infection priority tree T of G by modulo the small com-
munities from the network.
Definition 7.4 (Defining infection priority tree T ) Let G be a network constructed by Definition 3.1. We
define the infection priority tree T to be a directed graph as follows:
1. Let H be the graph obtained from G by deleting all the edges constructed by (3) (c) of Defini-
tion 3.1, keeping the directions in G.
2. Let T be the directed graph obtained from H by merging each of the homochromatic sets into a
single node.
Then we have that
Lemma 7.2 Any infection from a strong community to a strong community must be triggered by a di-
rected edge in the infection priority tree T .
Proof 13 By Definition 7.4, Definition 7.3, and Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 7.2 shows that the cascading behavior in the infection priority tree T is always directed from
a seed node to an old non-seed node created in (3) (b) of Definition 3.1.
Now the key to our proofs is that cascading procedure in T must terminate shortly, that is, after
O(log n) many steps.
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Lemma 7.3 With probability 1− o(1), the following hold:
1. The infection priority tree T is a directed tree.
2. The height of the infection priority tree T is O(log n).
Proof 14 By Definition 3.1 and Definition 7.4, T can be regarded as a graph constructed by a pref-
erential attachment scheme with d = 1 such that whenever a new node is created, it links to a node
chosen with probability proportional to the weights of nodes, at the same time, the weights of nodes are
increasing uniformly and randomly. Precisely, we restate the construction of T as follows:
(i) Take H2 to be a graph with two nodes 1, 2, one directed edge (2, 1) such that each node has a
weight w(i) = d for i = 1, 2.
For i+ 1 > 2, let pi = 1/(log i)a, and let Hi be the graph constructed at the end of time step i.
(ii) With probability pi, we create a new node, v say, in which case,
(a) let u0 be a node chosen with probability proportional to the weights of nodes in Hi, create a
directed edge (v, u0),
(b) let u1, u2, · · · , ud−1 be nodes chosen randomly and uniformly in Hi,
(c) for each j = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1, set w(u)← old w(u) + 1, and
(d) set w(v)[i + 1] = d.
(iii) Otherwise, then choose randomly and uniformly a node, u say, in Hi, set w(u)[i+1] = w(u)[i] +
2d.
Then T is the directed graph obtained from H by ignoring the weights of nodes.
For (1). Clearly, it is true that T is a tree, because whenever one new node is created, there is only
one new edge is added, and the graph is connected. (1) holds.
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For (2). By definition of T , the height of T is between a graph of the preferential attachment model
with d = 1 and a uniform recursive tree of the same number of nodes. By Lemma 5.7, with probability
1 − o(1), a uniform recursive tree of nodes n has height bounded by O(log n). By construction above,
T has height stochastically dominated by that of a uniform recursive tree of the same number of nodes.
Therefore, with probability 1− o(1), the height of T is bounded by O(log n). (2) holds.
By Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, T exactly captures the cascading behaviors among strong communities,
which is the key to our proofs.
Now we know that the proofs of both Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 consist of the following steps:
1. To prove that for any attack of poly logarithmic size, almost surely, there is a huge number of
strong communities.
2. Any infection among the strong communities must be triggered by an edge in the infection priority
tree of G, which goes at most O(log n) many steps, by Lemma 7.3.
(2) has been guaranteed by Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3. So the main issue for the proofs of Theo-
rem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 is actually step (1) above, which will be given in Subsections 7.2 and 7.3.
7.2 Uniform Threshold Security Theorem
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.1.
Let G be a network constructed by the security model. Consider a deliberate attack by targeting an
initial set S of size poly(log n). Note that the size of S, poly(log n), is much smaller than the number of
communities, i.e., Θ(n/ loga n), by (1) (i) of Theorem 3.1.
Proof 15 (Proof of Theorem 4.1) Set time T0 = (1 − δ)n, where δ = log−b0 n, where b0 will be deter-
mined later. We will show that with high probability, all the communities created before time step T0 are
large and thus strong.
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Lemma 7.4 Let 2 < b1 < a − b0. Then with probability 1 − o(1), every homochromatic set created
before time step T0 has a size Ω(logb1 n).
Proof 16 It is sufficient to show that, with probability 1− n−1, for every homochromatic set Sκ created
before T0, Sκ has a size Ω(logb1 n).
Suppose that Sκ is the set with color κ, and that it is created at time step t0 ≤ T0 for some t0. For
any t ≥ t0, define an indicator random variable Yt to be the event that the node created at time step t
chooses color κ.
Define {Zt} to be the independent Bernoulli trails such that
Pr[Zt = 1] =
(
1− 1
loga(1− δ)n
)
loga t
2t
.
Conditioned on the event E in Definition 5.1, we have that random variable Y :=∑nt=t′ Yt stochas-
tically dominates Z :=
∑n
t=t′ Zt for any t′ ≤ T0.
By definition, Z has an expectation
E[Z] ≥
(
1− 1
loga(1− δ)n
) n∑
t=T0+1
loga t
2t
≥ δn
2n
loga(1− δ)n = Ω(loga−b0 n).
Since 2 < b1 < a− b0, by the Chernoff bound,
Pr
[
Z = O(logb1 n)
]
≤ n−1.
Therefore, with probability 1− n−1, the size of Sκ is at least Y = Ω(logb1 n).
Secondly, we show that every seed node created before T0 probably has a large degree.
Lemma 7.5 With probability 1 − o(1), every seed node created before time step T0 has degree at least
Ω(logb1/2 n).
Proof 17 Let v be a seed node created at a time step ≤ T0. Suppose that v has color κ. Let S be the
set of all nodes sharing color κ. Then the community GS is the induced subgraph of S in G. The degree
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of the seed node v in G is contributed by both local edges and global edges. By the construction, GS
truthfully follows a power law, by Lemma 6.1, the degree of v contributed by local edges is expected
at least
√
|S|. By Lemma 7.4, with probability 1 − o(1), each S has a size Ω(logb1 n). The degree of
v has an expected degree at least Ω(logb1/2 n). Since b1 > 2, by the Chernoff bound, with probability
1− o(n−1), v’s degree is at least Ω(logb1/2 n). The lemma follows immediately by the union bound.
Now we are able to estimate the number of strong communities.
Lemma 7.6 Let b0 = 2+ ǫ and b1 = a− b0− ǫ2 , where ǫ is that defined in Theorem 4.1. With probability
1− o(1), all the communities created before time T0 are strong.
Proof 18 By Theorem 3.2, the length of degrees of a seed node is bounded by O(log n), and the second
degree of a seed node is bounded by O(1). By Chernoff bound, we have that, with probability 1− o(1),
for every seed node v, the degree of v contributed by global edges is bounded by O(log n). By Lemma
7.5, almost surely, for each seed node v, the fraction of v’s degree contributed by global edges is less
than or equal to O(log1−b1/2 n). Recall that the threshold parameter φ = Ω
(
1
logb n
)
for b = a2 − 2− ǫ
for arbitrary ǫ > 0. By the choices of b0 and b1, 1− b1/2 = −
(
a
2 − 2− 3ǫ4
)
< −b. The lemma follows.
For the total number of vulnerable communities, we have
Lemma 7.7 Let b2 = a+ b0. With probability 1−o(1), the number of vulnerable communities is at most
2n
logb2 n
.
Proof 19 By Lemma 7.6, we only need to bound the number of communities created after time step T0.
Since at time step t, a new color is created with probability pt = log−a t, the number of colors created
after time step T0, denoted by Nvul is expected to be
E[Nvul] =
n∑
t=T0+1
1
loga t
.
When n is large enough, by a simple integral computation, E[Nvul] is upper bounded by 3δn2 loga n . By the
Chernoff bound, with probability 1− o(1), Nvul is at most 2δnloga n = 2nlogb2 n . The lemma follows.
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Now we are ready for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Suppose that S is the initially targeted set of size ⌈logc n⌉. Choose b0 = 2 + ǫ, b1 = a− b0 − ǫ2 and
b2 = a+ b0.
By Lemma 7.7, with probability 1 − o(1), the number of vulnerable communities is at most 2n
logb2 n
.
By Lemma 7.3, the height of infection priority tree T is h = O(log n). By Lemma 7.2, infections among
strong communities must be triggered by an edge in the infection priority tree T . Therefore the number
of infected communities by attacks on S is at most
(
|S|+ 2n
logb2 n
)
· h = O
((
⌈logc n⌉+ 2n
logb2 n
)
· log n
)
.
By Theorem 3.1 (1), with probability 1− o(1), the largest community has a size O(loga+1 n). So the
number of infected nodes in G by attacks on S is at most
O
((
⌈logc n⌉+ 2n
logb2 n
)
· log n · loga+1 n
)
= o(n).
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is essentially a methodology of community analysis of networks of the
security model. The key ideas of the methodology are those in Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and Theorem 3.3,
Definition 7.3, Definition 7.4, Lemma 7.2, and Lemma 7.3.
The method allows us to divide all the communities into two classes, the first is the strong commu-
nities, and the second is the vulnerable ones. The two types of communities are distinguished by a time
step T0. This time stamp T0 is determined by both parameter δ, and essentially by the power b. Then
we show that communities created before time step T0 are strong, and that the number of communities
created after time step T0 is small.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the power law distribution in Theorem 3.1, is never an obstacle for security of
networks. Our proof of the security theorem show that the community structure of the networks isolates
54
the vulnerable nodes in a large number of small communities, that the homogeneity and randomness
among the seed nodes or “hubs” guarantee that most communities are strong, and that the infection
priority tree ensures that the cascading procedure among strong communities cannot be long.
7.3 Random Threshold Security Theorem
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.2. The proof has the same framework as before. By Lemmas
7.2, and 7.3, infections among strong communities must be triggered by edges in the infection priority
tree T , and infections in T are directed, and terminate by O(log n) many steps.
Therefore, the only issue is to prove that the number of vulnerable communities is small.
Proof 20 Let T0 = (1− δ)n, where δ = 100 log−b0 n and b0 to be determined later. Let T ′0 = n/100.
By a similar proof to that of Lemma 7.4, for every b1 ∈ (1, a − b0], we have that with probability
1− o(1), the following hold:
• Every community created at a time step t ≤ T ′0 has a size Ω(loga n), and
• Every community created at a time step t ∈ [T ′0, T0] has a size Ω(logb1 n).
By the proof of Lemma 7.5, we have that with probability 1− o(1),
1. A seed node created at a time step t ≤ T ′0 has degree Ω(loga/2 n), and
2. A seed node created at a time step t ∈ [T ′0, T0] has degree Ω(logb1/2 n).
Then we show that the number of vulnerable communities created before time step T0 is small.
Lemma 7.8 Let b0 = a2 − 1 and b1 = a2 + 1. With probability 1− o(1), there are only O
(
n
loga+(b1/2) n
)
communities created before time step T0 that are vulnerable.
Proof 21 By the Chernoff bound, with probability 1− o(1):
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(i) By Theorem 3.2, every seed node created before time step T ′0 has a degree at most O(log n)
contributed by global edges, and
(ii) All but O(log n) seed nodes created in time interval [T ′0, T0] have a degree O(1) contributed by
global edges.
Note that the threshold of each node is chosen randomly and uniformly. Then the communities
that are created in these two time slots and satisfy the above conditions are vulnerable with probability
O(log1−(a/2) n) and O(log−b1/2 n), respectively.
By Theorem 3.1 (1), with probability 1 − o(1), there are at most O
(
2n
loga n
)
communities. By the
choice of a > 6, −b1/2 > 1 − (a/2) holds. Therefore, the expected number of vulnerable communities
created before time step T0 is O
(
n
loga+(b1/2) n
)
.
Noting the independence of choice of threshold for each node, by using the Chernoff bound again,
the lemma follows.
By the proof of Lemma 7.7, there are only O
(
n
loga+b0 n
)
communities born after T0. So the total
number of vulnerable communities in G is O
(
n
loga+b0 n
+ n
loga+(b1/2) n
)
= O
(
n
loga+b0 n
)
.
Consider the infection priority tree T again. For any initial targeted set S of size ⌈logc n⌉, the size
of infUH(S) is at most
O
((
⌈logc n⌉+ 2n
loga+b0 n
)
· log n · loga+1 n
)
= o(n).
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
7.4 Framework for Security Analysis
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 imply the following three discoveries:
1) Structures are essential to the security of networks against cascading failure models of attacks,
2) There is a tradeoff between the role of structures and the role of thresholds in security of networks,
and
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3) Neither power law distribution (3) nor small world property (24) is an obstacle of security of
networks.
The first discovery is a mathematical principle. From the viewpoint of mathematics, we believe that
structures determine the properties. In so doing, a structural theory of networks would provide provable
guarantee for some of the key applications of network science. The nature of networks are the networks
themselves, instead of just statistical measures of the networks. The investigation of interactions and
structures of interactions of networks is hence essential to network theory and applications.
The second discovery explores that security of networks can be achieved theoretically by structures
of networks, and that there is a tradeoff between the role of structures and the role of lifting of the
thresholds. This discovery is in sharp contrast to the current practice of network security engineering
which basically lifts the thresholds. Exploring the tradeoffs between the role of structures and the role
of thresholds in security of networks would provide a foundation for network security engineering, and
hence it would be exactly the subject of security theory of networks. Our discovery here plays such a
role.
The third discovery is also highly nontrivial. The reasons are: intuitively speaking, power law allows
us to attack a small number of top degree nodes to generate a global cascading failure, and the small
world property means that spreading is so easy and so quick, so that a small number of attacks may easily
generate a global cascading failure. This intuition is reasonable in some sense. In fact, by observing our
proofs, we know that there is only a small window for us to construct networks to be both secure and to
have the power law and small world property.
Our discoveries imply that structure is a new, essential and guaranteed source for security, and that
the tradeoff between the role of structure and the role of thresholds may provide both a full understanding
of security and new technology for security engineering.
The proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 provide a general framework for theoretical analysis of security
of networks. The main steps for each of the uniform threshold security theorem and the random threshold
57
security theorem form the framework.
General framework:
1. Small community phenomenon
The network is rich in quality communities of small sizes
2. The communities satisfy some more properties such as:
(a) Each community has a few nodes dominating both internal and external links
For each community C , let dom(C) be the dominating set of C , which contains the hubs of
the community C .
(b) For each community C , the neighbors of nodes in C outside of C are evenly distributed in
different communities.
3. We say that a community is strong, if it will never be infected by the collection of outside commu-
nities, unless it has already been infected by nodes in the community itself.
There are a huge number of strong communities.
4. By modulo the small communities, we can extract an infection priority tree of the network.
5. Infections among the strong communities must be triggered by an edge in the infection priority
tree of the network.
6. The infection priority tree of the network has height O(log n).
(1) provides a foundation for community analysis of the security of networks. (2) ensures that there
is a huge number of strong communities. The existence of the infection priority tree T is the key to
our proofs of the security theorems. (4), (5) and (6) ensure that cascading procedure among the strong
communities has a path of length O(log n).
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The general framework above provides not only a methodology to theoretically analyze the security
of networks, but also new technology for enhancing security of real world networks.
8 Threshold Theorem of Robustness of PA
In this section, we prove Theorems 4.3 and 4.5.
Suppose that G = (V,E) is a network constructed from the PA model.
Given a node v ∈ V , we say that v is vulnerable if one infected neighbor is enough to infect it, or
equivalently, its degree dv is at most 1/φ.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 mainly consists of two steps:
(1) By the definition of G, there is a large connected component, C say, in the subgraph induced by
all the vulnerable nodes in G.
In this case, if one node in C is targeted, then all nodes in C become infected.
(2) G is an expander in the sense that the conductance of G is large.
Therefore the set of infected nodes C certainly infect new nodes in V \ C due to the reason that
φ fraction neighbors of v are in C . This cascading procedure will continue until the whole G or a
large part of G being infected.
The second step of our proof implies that an expander-like graph is unlikely to be robust.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 follows from a simple observation that if φ is larger than l/d, then there is
no vulnerable node in G. For each node, if it is not targeted in the initial random errors, then it cannot be
infected unless at least l of its neighbors are infected. On the other hand, this is unlikely to happen at the
beginning when we randomly pick the initial set of size k = o(n
l
l+1 ).
At first, we prove a basic version of Theorem 4.3 for the case ε = 1 in 8.1. The proof of the main
theorem will be developed by tightening the parameters in Subsection 8.2. In the end of this section, we
prove Theorem 4.5.
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8.1 Global Cascading Theorem of Single Node
Before proving the full Theorem 4.3, we prove a basic result of the theorem for the case of ε = 1.
Theorem 8.1 There exists a positive integer d0 such that almost surely (over the construction of G), the
following inequality holds:
Pr
v∈RV
[infφG({v}) = V ] ≥
1
2
,
where φ = 12d .
Proof 22 We estimate the degree of each vertex. Denote by vi the i-the vertex in G.
By Lemma 6.1, for time step n4 , the expected degree of each vertex created after time step n4 is at most
2d. So the expected number of nodes whose degrees are at most 2d is 34n, which correspond to last 34n
nodes.
From now on, we assume that there are 34n nodes (not necessarily the last ones) which have degree
at most 2d in G.
(In fact, a small deficit around 34n, for instance, (34 − ǫ)n for some small ǫ, does not influence our
analysis at all. This will happen almost surely.)
Let W be a set of all nodes having degrees at most 2d. Note that W is exactly the set of all vulnerable
nodes in G. Let GW be the induced subgraph of W in G.
We will show that with probability 1−o(1), the largest connected component in GW has size at least
n/2.
To explain our ideas without being trapped by complicated parameters, we first prove a weak version
of the conclusion.
Lemma 8.1 The size of the largest connected component in GW is almost surely at least n4 .
Proof 23 Suppose to the contrary that the lemma fails to hold. We will show that with probability
1− o(1), the number of connected components of GW is 1. In this case, the size of the largest connected
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component is almost surely larger than n4 , contradicting the assumption.
In this proof below, a connected component means a connected component of GW .
Suppose that {v1, v2, . . . , v 3
4
n} is the set W listed by the natural time ordering of nodes to be created.
For j = 1, 2, · · · , 34n, let tj be the time step at which vj is created.
Let m1 = 516n. Let W1 = {v1, v2, · · · , vm1}, and W2 = W \W1. We use GW1 [t] to denote the
graph induced by W1 at the end of time step t.
Suppose for the worst case, that GW1 [tm1 ] is an independent set, i.e., there is no even one edge
among nodes in W1 at the end of time step tm1 .
For every integer i ∈ [1, 716n], consider the influence of node vm1+i on the number of connected
components in the current graph. Let τi be the probability that there is an edge from vm1+i to some node
in {v1, . . . , vm1+i−1}.
By the construction of G, the volume of {v1, . . . , vm1+i−1} is at least ( 516n+ i−1)d, and the volume
of the graph constructed at the end of time step tm1+i is at most 2(n4 +m1 + i)d = 2( 916n+ i)d.
Thus
τi ≥
( 516n+ i− 1)d
2( 916n+ i)d
>
1
4
.
Let N1 be the current volume of the largest connected component, and N2 be the current volume of
all the nodes in W . Then N1 ≤ n4 · 2d = nd2 , N2 ≥ N1+( 516n− n4 + i− 1)d ≥ N1+ nd16 . Let ρ = N1N2 be
the probability that an edge of vm1+i connecting to the current largest connected component. ρ is also
the upper bound of the probability that an edge of vm1+i connecting to some predetermined connected
component. So ρ ≤ 89 . Let ∆i be the difference of the numbers of connected components of the graphs
after and before the appearance of vm1+i and its d edges. A positive ∆i means this number increases
and otherwise decreases. Let p be the probability of ∆i < 0, p0 be the probability of ∆i = 0 and p1 be
the probability of ∆i > 0. Note that ∆i > 0 means all the d edges of vm1+i do not connect to any node
in current W , and then we have
p1 ≤ (1− τi)d.
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∆i = 0 means that there are j (1 ≤ j ≤ d) edges of vm1+i join a single connected component while
others do not. We have
p0 ≤
d∑
j=1
(
d
j
)
τ ji (1− τi)d−jρj−1
≤
d∑
j=1
(
d
j
)
τ ji (1− τi)d−j(
8
9
)j−1
=
9
8
[[
(1− τi) + 8
9
τi
]d
− (1− τi)d
]
=
9
8
[
(1− 1
9
τi)
d − (1− τi)d
]
.
Since p+ p0 + p1 = 1, the expectation of ∆i satisfies
E(∆i) ≤ p1 − p = 2p1 + p0 − 1 ≤ 9
8
(1− 1
9
τi)
d +
7
8
(1− τi)d − 1.
Since τi > 14 , there must be some constant d
′ such that for any integer d ≥ d′, E(∆i) ≤ −56 . On this
condition, the number of connected components in the end is expected to be a negative number. To prove
that the number reduces to the minimum possible number 1, we use the supermartingale inequality (see
(7), Theorem 2.32). Let m2 = 716n. We consider the totally reduced amount compared with the initial
number m1 at step i of the last m2 steps as a random variable Xi (0 ≤ i ≤ m2). We compute the totally
reduced amount by summing up all the reduced numbers in the former steps. Keep it in mind that all the
discussion is under the assumption that there is no connected component of size at least n4 in the end. So
the totally reduced amount would exceed m1. By definition, X0 = 0. At each step, the reduced number is
expected to be at least 5/6. Let Yi = Xi− 56 i. Then Y0 = 0, E[Yi|Yi−1] ≥ Yi−1, and so Y0, Y1, . . . , Ym2
is a supermartingale. To show that with high probability, Xm2 is at least m1 − 1, we only have to show
that with probability o(1), Ym2 is no more than m1 − 2 − 56 · 716n = −( 596n + 2). By the definition of
the PA model, we know that Yi−E[Yi|Yi−1] ≤ d and Var[Yi|Yi−1] = E[(Yi−E[Yi|Yi−1])2|Yi−1] ≤ d2.
Thus
Pr
[
Ym2 ≤ −(
5
96
n+ 2)
]
≤ exp
(
− (5n/96 + 2)
2
2(d2m2 + d(5n/96 + 2)/3)
)
= exp(−Ω(n)).
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This means that under our assumption, with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n)), the number of connected
components in the end reduces to 1. Lemma 8.1 follows.
The idea of the proof of Lemma 8.1 is to assume that there is no connection for the part of the first
coming nodes (the first 516n nodes, slightly larger than n4 ), and then show that the remaining 716n nodes
(slightly larger than 516n) combine together to form a large connected component. By the proof, it is also
valid to choose m1 = n8 + δn (slightly larger than n8 ) and m2 = n8 + 2δn (slightly larger than m1),
where δ is a small constant. Then by a similar argument, we can show that there must be some constant
d′0 (relating to δ) such that for any integer d ≥ d′0, when the first m1 + m2 = n4 + 3δn nodes come,
with probability 1 − o(1), there is a connected component of size at least n8 . A key observation here is
that, the current number of connected components is at most n4 + 3δn − n8 + 1 = n8 + 3δn + 1. So by
using the next n8 + 4δn nodes, we can prove that there must be some constant d
′
1 (relating to δ) such
that for any integer d ≥ d′1, when the first 38n + 7δn nodes come, with probability 1 − o(1), there is
a connected component of size at least n4 . So recursively, using the following n8 + 8δn nodes, we have
that there must be some constant d′2 (relating to δ), such that for any integer d ≥ d′2, when the first
n
2n + 15δn nodes come, with probability 1 − o(1), there is a connected component of size at least 38n.
At last, using the remaining n8 + 16δn nodes, we have that there must be some constant d
′
3 (relating to
δ), such that for any integer d ≥ d′3, when all the nodes in W come, with probability 1− o(1), there is a
connected component of size at least n2 . Choosing δ = 18(1+2+4+8+16) = 1248 makes the above analysis
work. Setting d′ = max{d′0, d′1, d′2, d′3}, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 8.2 There is a constant d′ such that for any d ≥ d′, with probability 1 − o(1), the size of the
largest connected component in GW is at least n2 .
Denote by S the largest connected component in GW . When we randomly and uniformly choose an
initially infected node in G, once it falls in S or its neighbors, then the whole S (including at least n/2
vulnerable nodes) will be infected. This event happens with probability at least 1/2. So next, we only
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have to show that based on the infected S, the cascading procedure will sweep over the whole graph G,
which completes the proof of Theorem 8.1.
Mihail, Papadimitriou and Saberi (18) have shown that the graph constructed by the PA model
almost surely has a constant conductance depending on d. Formally, they showed that when d ≥ 2, for
any positive constant c < 2(d− 1)− 1, there exists an α = min{d−12 − c+14 , 15 , (d−1) ln 2−(2 ln 5)/52(ln d+ln2+1) } such
that Pr[Φ(G) ≤ αα+d ] = o(n−c) (see (18), Theorem 1), where we use Φ(G) to denote the conductance
of G. By their proof, this result can be easily modified to the following lemma.
Lemma 8.3 There exists a constant d′′ such that for any integer d ≥ d′′ and any α < min{d−12 − 14 ,
√
d},
we have
Pr
G∈RP(n,d)
[Φ(G) ≤ α
d+ α
] = o(1).
Proof 24 The proof follows from that of (18) except for different choices of the parameters. We introduce
the ideas here, and refer to (18) for details. Let φ(G) be the edge expansion of graph G which is
defined as φ(G) = minS⊆V E(S,S)min{|S|,|S|} . In the PA model, φ(G) can be used to bound the conductance,
Φ(G) ≥ φ(G)d+φ(G) . So we only have to prove Pr[φ(G) ≤ α] = o(1). Let 2 ≤ k ≤ n/2. Consider all the
subset of nodes of size at most k, and then we can conclude that
Pr[φ(G) ≤ α] ≤
n/2∑
k=2
αk(
ed
α
)2αk(
k
n
)(d−1−2α)k .
For the O(n) terms in this summation, if we upper bound the leading term by o(n−1), then the sum
is upper bounded by o(1). We study the function f(k) = αk(edα )2αk( kn)(d−1−2α)k for 2 ≤ k ≤ n/2.
It can be shown that there is a real number x in the interval [2, n/2] such that f(k) monotonically
decreases in [2, x] and monotonically increases in [x, n/2]. Thus the leading term is either f(2) or
f(n/2). If α < d−12 − 14 , f(2) = 2α(edα )4α( 2n)2(d−1−2α) = o(n−1). On the other hand, since f(n/2) =
αn
2 [(
ed
α )
2α(12 )
d−1−2α]n/2, there must be some constant d′′ such that for any integer d ≥ d′′, if α < √d,
then the product in the square bracket is less than 1. So f(n/2) decreases exponentially as n increases.
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.3.
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Lemma 8.3 guarantees that with probability 1 − o(1), the conductance of G is at least 1
2
√
d
. On
this condition, we show that the cascading starting from S will spread all over the whole graph. Since
every node in G has degree at least d and vol(S) is 2nd, we have vol(S) ≥ 12nd and so vol(S) =
2nd − vol(S) ≤ 32nd. If vol(S) ≤ nd, that is, vol(S) is no more than half of vol(G), then E(S, S) ≥
vol(S) · Φ(S) ≥ n
√
d
4 , and
E(S,S)
vol(S)
≥ 1
6
√
d
. For each node in S, let ES(v) be the number of nodes in S
that are incident to some node in S and dv be the degree of v. Then we have
E(S, S)
vol(S)
=
∑
v∈S
ES(v)∑
v∈S
dv
≥ 1
6
√
d
.
By averaging, there must be some node v ∈ S whose at least 1
6
√
d
fraction of neighbors are infected.
When d ≥ 9, this fraction is at least φ = 12d , and v is also infected. Add v into S and continue until
vol(S) ≥ nd and vol(S) ≤ nd. Now E(S,S)
vol(S)
≥ Φ(G) ≥ 1
2
√
d
, which is larger than φ. Thus by averaging
again, we know that there is a node v ∈ S being infected. Recursively, the whole graph G will be
infected. The proof of Theorem 8.1 is completed by choosing d0 = max{d′, d′′, 9}.
8.2 Global Cascading Theorem of PA
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof 25 (Proof of Theorem 4.3) The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows the proof of Theorem 8.1 step by step
with tighter parameters. By Lemma 6.1, we suppose that there are (1 − 1
(1+ε)2
)n nodes having degree
at most (1 + ε)d. Denote by W the set of them, and W are exactly the set of vulnerable nodes. Let
p = 23(1− 1(1+ε)2 ). By the proof of Lemma 8.2, we know that there exists an integer d′ which only relates
to ε such that for any integer d ≥ d′, with probability 1 − o(1), there exists a connected component S
of size at least pn in GW . If we uniformly pick a random initial node, then with probability at least p,
it falls in S or its neighbors, which makes the whole S infected. Then we only have to show that the
infection based on S will spread all over the whole graph G.
65
Note that the volume of S is at least pnd. So we can choose a d′′ (only relating to ε), such that for
any integer d ≥ d′′, by averaging, there exists a node v ∈ S whose at least φ fraction of neighbors are
infected. Then add v to S and continue the procedure until the volume of S exceeds nd. By Lemma
8.3, the current conductance of S is at least 1√
d+1
, also larger than φ. Thus by averaging again, there
is a node v ∈ S being infected. Recursively, the whole graph G will be infected. We choose d0 =
max{d′, d′′}, and complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.
8.3 Robustness Theorem of Graphs
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.5 which holds for all simple graphs.
Proof 26 (Proof of Theorem 4.5) First, we bound by o(n−1) the probability that a single node is infected
by the initial set S of size k = o(n ll+1 ). Then Theorem 4.5 follows immediately by the union bound.
For a node v ∈ V \ S, denote by D the degree of v. Then D ≥ d. We can suppose that D = O(k),
because otherwise, since φ is a constant, v cannot be infected even if all the nodes in S are neighbors of
v. Let t = ⌊ ld ·D + 1⌋. Since G is a simple graph, on the condition that v ∈ V \ S, v is infected by S
with probability
D∑
i=t

 D
i

·

 n− 1−D
k − i



 n− 1
k


=
D∑
i=t
(
D
i
)
· (n−1−D)!(k−i)!(n−1−k−(D−i))! ·
k!(n−1−k)!
(n−1)!
≤
D∑
i=t
(
De
i
)i · ( kn−D)i
≤
D∑
i=t
(
dek
l(n−D)
)i
,
where e = 2.718 · · · is the natural logarithm. The first “≤” comes from the inequality
(
D
i
)
≤ (Dei )i
and the second “≤” comes from i ≥ Dld . Note that for each term i, i ≥ l + 1. Since k = o(n
l
l+1 ), this
sum is at most o(n−1). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.5.
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9 Overlapping Communities Undermine Security of Networks
As we have seen that the topological, probabilistic and combinatorial properties in Theorems 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3 guarantee the security theorems. In these proofs, the following properties are essential:
(i) The small community phenomenon.
(ii) Local heterogeneity
That is, the seed node of a community plays a central role in both internal and external links of the
community.
(iii) Randomness and uniformity among the global edges.
(iv) The existence of the infection priority tree of height O(log n).
We further analyze the corresponding roles of properties (i) - (iv) above. The role of (i) is clear,
since otherwise, it would be possible a single targeted node in a large community may infect the whole
community which is large. (ii) and (iii) ensure that almost all communities are strong. (iv) ensures that
cascading among strong communities has a path of short length.
Except for (i) - (iv) above, we notice that the small communities in the security model are disjoint.
Therefore there is no overlapping community phenomenon in networks of the security model.
For nontrivial networks constructed from models such as the ER and the PA models, we know that
there is no even a community structure in the networks. However overlapping communities seem uni-
versal in real networks. Intuitively, overlapping communities undermine security of the networks. The
reason is that if a node, v say, has two communities, C1 and C2 say, then attack on v is in fact attacks on
both the communities C1 and C2. We show that this intuition is correct.
To verify the conclusion, we modify the security model as follows.
Definition 9.1 (Overlapping model) Given homophyly exponent a, d1 ≥ 2, d2 ≥ 2 and d = d1+ d2. We
construct a network as follows.
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(1) Let G2 be an initial graph such that each node of G2 is called a seed node, and is associated with
a distinct color.
For i > 2, suppose that Gi−1 has been defined., and let pi = 1/(log i)a. We define Gi as follows.
(2) Create a new node, v.
(3) With probability pi, v chooses a new color, c say, in which case:
(a) We say that v is a seed node,
(b) Create an edge (v, u), where u is chosen with probability proportional to the degrees of nodes
in Gi−1,
(c) Create d1 − 1 edges (v, uj) for j = 1, 2, · · · , d1 − 1, where each uj is chosen randomly and
uniformly among all seed nodes in Gi−1, and
(d) Choose randomly and uniformly an old color, c′ say,
(e) We say that v has two colors, both c and c′, and
(f) Create d2 edges (v,wk) for k = 1, 2, · · · , d2, where each wk is chosen with probability
proportional to the degrees of all nodes sharing the old color c′ in Gi−1.
(4) Otherwise, then v chooses an old color, in which case, then
(a) Let c be an old color chosen randomly and uniformly among all colors appeared in Gi−1,
(b) Let c be the color of v, and
(c) Create d edges (v, xl) for l = 1, 2, · · · , d, where each xl is chosen with probability propor-
tional to the degrees among all nodes sharing color c.
Suppose that G is a network constructed from Definition 9.1. By definition, it is easy to see that G
has the small diameter property. In Figure 4, we compare the degree distributions of networks of the
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security model and the overlapping model. The networks have n = 10, 000 nodes, homophyly exponent
a = 1.5, d = 10 and d1 = d2 = 5 for the overlapping model. The experiment shows that both the
networks follow the same power law.
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Figure 4: Power law of networks of the security model and the overlapping model
Let G be a network constructed from the overlapping model. We define a community to be the
induced subgraph of a homochromatic set. Clearly a community is connected. In Figure 5, we compare
the distribution of conductances of a network of the security model and a network of the overlapping
model with the same parameters as above.
From Figure 5, we know that distributions of conductances of all the communities are similar to each
other, and almost all are small. This shows that networks constructed from the overlapping model are
rich in small communities too.
The only difference between G and networks constructed from the security model is that for each
seed node of G, v say, v contains in 2 communities. Our intuition is that overlapping communities
undermine security of the networks.
In Figure 6, we compare the security of networks constructed from both the security model and the
overlapping model for n = 10, 000, a = 1.5, d = 10, and d1 = d2 = 5.
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Experiments in Figure 6 show that the network constructed from the security model is more secure
than that of the overlapping model for attacks of all small-scales. This verifies that overlapping commu-
nities do undermine security of networks.
By this reason, we give up the phenomenon of overlapping communities in our elementary security
theory of networks.
However it is still an open issue to fully understand the undermining of overlapping communities
in security of networks. Solving this problem may provide a new way to enhance security of networks
by distinguishing the different roles of a node in different communities. It is not surprising we may
need a way to deal with the undermining effect of overlapping communities on security of networks. In
general, it is an interesting open question to fully understand the roles of overlapping communities, since
it seems universal in many real networks. Sometimes, overlapping communities are bad, for instance,
every corrupt official confuses his/her public and private roles.
10 Conclusions and future directions
In this paper, we proposed definitions of security and robustness of networks to highlight the ability
of complex networks to resist global cascading failures caused by a small number of deliberate attacks
and random errors, respectively. We use the threshold cascading failure models to simulate information
spreading in networks.
We introduced a security model of networks such that networks constructed from the model are
provably secure under both uniform and random threshold cascading failure models, and simultaneously
follow a power law, and satisfy the small world phenomenon with a remarkable O(log n) time algorithm
to find a short path between arbitrarily given two nodes. This shows that networks constructed from
the security model are secure, follow the natural property of power law, and allow a navigation of time
complex O(log n).
The security model shows that dynamic and scale-free networks can be secure for which homo-
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phyly, randomness and preferential attachment are the underlying mechanisms, providing a principle for
investigating the security of networks theoretically and generally.
Our security theorems explore some new discoveries between the roles of structures and of thresholds
in the security of networks. The proofs of the security theorems provide a general framework to analyze
both theoretically and practically security of networks.
It seems surprising that networks of the security model satisfy simultaneously all the properties stated
in the three theorems, i.e., Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and that a merging of the principles in Theorems
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 gives rise to the proofs of the security theorems, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. This is a
mathematical creation and mathematical beauty with immediate and far-reaching implications in network
communication and network science.
On the other hand, the mechanisms of homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment of the
security model are natural selections in evolutions of complex systems in both nature and society. This
may explain the reason why networks of the security model have the remarkable properties here. This
may also imply that the security model reflects some of the natural laws and social principles. This poses
some fundamental questions such as: Does nature compute hard problems? Does nature evolve safely?
Does society organize securely and stably? A possible approach to answering these questions could be
to explore the physical, biological and social science understandings of the security model.
As usual, many real networks may not evolve as our security model. This is not surprised. There are
always some differences between networks constructed from models and real networks. For instance, i)
nontrivial networks of the PA model fail to have a community structure, but almost all real networks have,
ii) nontrivial networks of the ER model fail to have a community structure or power law distribution, but
almost all real networks have, and iii) networks of the small world model fail to have a power law, but
almost all real networks have.
However, in our case, if real networks evolve in a way far from our security model, then it may imply
that the real networks are highly unlikely to be secure, or worse, not even to be robust against a few
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random errors. This situation means that we do really and urgently need a theory to guarantee security
of the networks in which we are living.
The mechanisms of the security model are natural selections in organizations of networks in both
nature and society. However, the construction of networks in Definition 3.1 is carefully organized. A
reader may wonder whether or not there is a cheaper construction of the networks with less ingredients
than that in our definition. This could be possible, however, by our understanding, security of networks
cannot be achieved freely, either in theory or in engineering.
A reader may wonder Definition 3.1 is a simple modification of the PA model, the two models should
give similar networks. Why are the networks so different? It is true. However, there are two more new
ideas introduced in the security model: the first is that every node has its own characteristic at the very be-
ginning of its birth, that is, either remarkable (with new color) or normal (with old color), and the second
is that two more natural mechanisms are introduced to remarkable nodes and normal nodes respectively.
More importantly, the new ideas and the new mechanisms introduce ordering and combinatoric princi-
ples in the construction of networks. This perhaps explains that combinatorics plays a remarkable role in
networks, and that purely probabilistic and single mechanism fails to capture complexity in nature and
society.
By Theorem 4.1, for φ = O( 1
logb n
)≪ 1/d, networks generated from the security model is φ-robust
and φ-secure. For the same constant d, the networks generated from both the PA model and the security
model have the same average degree. By Theorem 4.1, the security threshold for the security model can
be arbitrarily small as n increases, while by Theorems 4.4 and 4.6, the robustness threshold for the PA
model can only be the constant 1/d. These theorems indicate that the structure of a network is key to
the robustness and security although power law and small world properties exist in both models. Neither
of these two properties is an obstacle to network robustness and security, while the small community
phenomenon and connection patterns among communities play an essential role. Consequently, the
security model provides an algorithm to construct dynamically networks which are secure against any
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attacks of small sizes under both uniform and random threshold cascading failure models, and which
satisfy all the useful properties of usual networks.
Our results start a theoretical approach to network security. However there is a huge number of
important issues open, for which we list some of them:
1. The role of homophyly exponent
We notice that the homophyly exponent a in Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and 4.2 is greater than 1, 4 and
6 respectively, showing some differences among the fundamental theorem, the uniform threshold
security theorem and the random threshold security theorem. The assumptions of a > 4 and a > 6
are essentially used in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. By Theorem 3.2, it seems
necessary for a to be large to make sure that almost all communities are strong. However for large
a, the sizes of communities are also large, so that attack on a single node in a community may
infect all nodes of the large community. Of course, for theoretical results, we only need to prove
the theorems for all sufficiently large n, in which case, large a is not a problem. In practice, the
sizes of networks are limited, in which case, it is necessary to choose appropriate a to make a
balance to achieve the best possible security. Fortunately we have shown experimentally in (15)
that even for just a > 1, for small n, networks of the security model are much more secure than
that of both the ER and PA models under both random and uniform threshold cascading failure
models. This poses a question to theoretically study the security theorems for just a > 1, which
will be more helpful for practical applications. Answering this question is not going to be easy,
which calls for new analysis or new ideas.
In our proofs, the average number of edges d is assumed to be a constant. This assumption has no
effect on theoretical results for all sufficiently large n. However, for fixed number n, the value d
plays a role. Usually the larger is d, the less secure is the network. This is reasonable, because, the
larger is d, the denser is the network. However this problem is interested in only practice.
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In practice, many real networks may not be secure for which there are too many reasons. However,
security may have only one reason. Our principles and theorems here provide a chance for us to
examine the reasons why a given real network is insecure. Once we know the reasons of insecurity
of a network, we may have ways to secure the network.
2. Security vs robustness
Our theorems show that the security model in Definition 3.1 is secure, and that the preferential
attachment model in (3) is non-robust. It would be interesting to find a model of networks (dy-
namic, and with power law and small diameter property etc) that it is robust, but insecure. The
significance of answering this question is to fully understand the robustness and the security of
networks.
3. Criterions for security
Our security model provides a principle for security. However, it is open to define criterions
for security of a given network. This poses fundamental open questions such as: What are the
theoretical criterions to measure quantitatively the security of real networks? What are the best
possible algorithms to compute security indices of real networks?
4. Enhancing security
A new fundamental question closely related to security applications is to enhance security of net-
works. In practice, we are given a network, G say, and asked to make a minimal modification of G
to generate a network, H say, such that H keeps all the useful properties of G and such that H is
much more secure than G. Our security model suggests some strategies for enhancing the security
of networks. However, theoretical study of this issue is completely open.
5. Influence of structures
To consider the influence of a structure, GS say (the induced subgraph of S), instead of just the set
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S of nodes.
6. Fully understand the roles of mechanisms, structures in the security of networks
7. Security and game
To introduce games in security strategies of networks.
8. Security and diffusion models
To consider a variety of diffusion models according to different applications, for example, the
independent cascading failure model in the context of marketing (10), (11).
9. Security of weighted networks
To study the security of weighted and directed versions of networks to better capture new phenom-
ena in the globalizing economic networks etc.
10. Robustness of networks
Our results in Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 have implications in applications due to the fact that most
real networks heavily depend on the preferential attachment scheme without guaranteeing the large
threshold for all the vertices. This would imply that most real networks may not be even robust
against random errors (or random attacks). And more importantly, the gap between the robustness
threshold and non-robustness threshold is small, it could be very easy for a network to be non-
robust. This means that robustness of networks is not an issue we can take for granted, and that
global failure of real networks could be simply caused by random errors, instead of deliberate
attacks. For this reason, robustness needs to be studied separately.
Finally we emphasize that our theory is to investigate the roles of structures, and the tradeoff between
the role of structures and the role of thresholds in the security of networks. In engineering, security
could be achieved by lifting the thresholds for all nodes, without considering the roles of structures of
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networks. A relatively long term challenge is to build a bridge between theory and engineering of security
of networks. In practice, one more tough issue could be to distinguish positive and negative contents in
the cascading procedure, which is already not purely a scientific problem.
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